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Scholarship and Ideology*
By BHIKHU PAREKH

One of the most distinctive characteristics of the modern university
is the tremendous emphasis placed on research, on "expanding the
frontiers of knowledge." The faculty has argued, and the university
authorities have in many cases accepted, that research is the only
worth-while academic activity and that the university largely exists
simply to promote it. In its name the faculty has sometimes even
ignored, with official connivance, many of its academic obligations.
Although, from the standpoint of the university, teaching is more important, research has become a new industry, a new god whose
directives, it is believed, only the illiterate could violate.
Conceptually and historically, research refers to the activity of discovering facts not hitherto known, or once known but subsequently
forgotten. In its extended sense, it refers to a purposive investigation
into the views of other writers on a given topic. Central to the concept
of research is the idea of collecting information by investigation, by
"looking up" a book or a document or "looking out" for certain
phenomena in the laboratory. It is therefore an activity that is crucial
to history, understood as an activity of reconstructing a past event
or an epoch as fully and in as detailed a manner as possible. Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine any significant activity of a historian that does
not involve research. To a slightly lesser degree, it is crucial to science.
Whether he is a botanist or a zoologist or a physicist, a scientist is looking for new natural and experimental facts, and is thus engaged in
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research. But unlike a historian, facts are interesting to him not in
themselves but only as instances, as falling into a general predictable
pattern, for his primary concern is to construct a general theory. Now
theorizing is not just, or even primarily, a matter of gathering facts,
but largely one of sustained and critical reflection on them in order to
elucidate and establish regular and orderly rela tions between them. Of
course, hard, concentrated and imaginative thinking does not take
place in a vacuum and one is therefore required to collect facts. That
is to say, in the scientist's pursuit of knowledge, resea rch (a more or
less empirical activi ty ) by itself is never enough, and needs to be supplemented by reflection ( a non-empirical, a nd what earlier philosophers used to call a rational, activity). Speaking generally, the more
theoretical a form of inquiry, the greater the role of reflection and
lesser the role of research. And when a form of inquiry is purely theoretical-for example, some forms of mathematics and metaphysicsresearch plays very little role in it.
There a re other a reas where knowledge is expanded without much
research. A novelist or a poet exploring new forms of expression is
deepening our insight into human life or into the new possibilities of
the literary medium, and yet no research need be involved. Or again,
a philosopher who a nalyses concepts and draws distinctions between
them often needs to do no more than sit in the armchair and think.
His "source material" lies handy in ordinary language and experience,
and often he does not have to look up or look out but only to look into
his own experiences.
The point I am making is that knowledge is expanded and deepened a nd enriched in a variety of ways, of which research is not the
only one or always even the most important. R esearch occurs in some
but not in all inquiries, and for many of those in which it does occur,
its significa nce often lies in its ability to generate or destroy a theory.
Further, research does not go on only in the laboratory or in research
surveys or in the archives or in the library. It goes on in interpersonal
conversa tions as well. For example, a political philosopher, when discussing political events with a fri end, may be observing how the la tter
interprets and describes them and how he uses certain words. Thus
research is a complex activity tha t cannot be reduced to a single model.
When these limitations of resea rch are ignored, and when it is seen
as the only worth-while activity, or is defined in terms of a single
model, or is divorced from its theoretical moorings and aspirations,
certain unfortunate trends begin to arise. A writer might come to feel
tha t he is not doing anything intellectualy worth-while unless he is
collecting new empirical facts. This danger is pa rticularly great in disciplines like politics, sociology and anthropology, that have their feet
in both the empirical and philosophical camp. A writer here might
come to feel tha t he should give up an "abstract," "intuitive," "sub-
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jective" and "speculative" approach to his discipline, and concentrate
instead on studying it empirically-for example, by drafting a questionnaire, hiring a few research assistants, and "collecting" hard empirical data. But if his talents and interests lie elsewhere, he feels out of
character in his new project, which therefore does no good to him or
to the others in the field. Still determined, he might try his luck elsewhere by deciding to "dig out" some "interesting" facts about a deservedly forgotten past thinker. His plight is almost like that of a fat
girl who will not wear anything but a mini skirt because this is the only
thing accepted as a dress.
Even in those areas where empirical work is essential, a questionable approach may come to be adopted in the belief that facts must
speak "for themselves," which as we shall presently see they never
do. Collecting facts by indefatigable research may come to be seen as
sufficient for illuminating a problem. For example, a student of international relations, concerned to understand, say, the behavior of the
Secretaries of State, might go on to collect as much data about as many
of them as he could, but would not want to concentrate on just one of
them, intuitively enter into his perception of his role, and construct
a sensitive, historical-biographical-sociological account. Such an attempt- to enter into his mind or to grasp his role subjectively and from
within-is regarded as non-empirical, speculative, and not worth
undertaking. And yet often such a procedure could illuminate the
Secretary's behavior, and that of others like him, much more than a
long list of tables and charts. F acts, scrupulously and diligently collected and stated with mechanical preciseness, still lack flesh and remain uncomprehended. It is amazing how in many research works one
finds only a neat classification of data, but rarely a sustained argument
or a reflective and critical analysis of their various possible
interpretations.
An intellectual inquiry gets distorted not only when it is made to
conform to a narrow and rigid conception of research, but also when
research is divorced from its theoretical underpinnings. A kind of inquiry then arises tha t may be sanctioned by the prevailing academic
consensus but that, m the ultima te analysis, has little intellectual
justification.
Theory performs a t least three important functions for research.
First, it gives research its rationale. One searches facts because one
wants, say, to arrive at a theory, or to falsify a theory, or to arbitrate
between two or more conflicting theories. A theory provides a purpose,
an obj ective to aim at, and thereby determines both the starting point
and the terminus of the inquiry. Second, it guides one's selection of
facts by indicating what facts are relevant and what not, and of those
that are, which ones are significant and which not. Third, when confirmed by facts, a theory becomes an integral part of the existing fund
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of knowledge, which it thereby enriches and expands. Theories are
like tributaries that contribute their respective insights to a constantly
expanding ocean of knowledge.
Now if the inquirer lacks a theory, his research suffers on all three
counts. He does not know why he is collecting facts. Without a guiding
purpose, since facts are in principle infinite, the inquiry has simply no
end, no natural terminus. Like the individual in the classical liberal
theory who had an insatiable appetite for power (Hobbes), or wealth
(Locke), or pleasure (Bentham), or progress (J. S. Mill), the researcher continues aggressively and puritanically to accumulate more
and yet more facts. It is suggestive that we often describe his activity
as one of "gathering," "accumulating," and "aggregating" facts, as if
facts like stones only need to be mechanically piled up. Logically, his
ultimate ideal becomes either to discover every fact about every aspect
of the universe so that nothing new or surprising will ever occur ; or,
more consistently, to keep digging, with the end continually receding,
for newer and newer facts. Research, in its latter form, becomes an
eternally necessary and self-perpetuating activity, since for every fact
discovered, a few more are added to the growing pile of those needing
to be discovered-that this fact was discovered by so and so at such and
such a time in such and such a way. We could always ask and be required to answer if X really discovered it at this time, and in this way.
If, therefore, following our researcher, we agreed to define knowledge
only in terms of the number of facts known, we would constantly be
increasing our ignorance!
Other implications of theory-less research are too obvious to need
detailed consideration. A researcher without a theory lacks any principle of the significance of facts, and since facts cannot be evaluated
in the absence of such a principle, each fact and piece of research
comes to be considered "as good as" another; and the student tends to
believe that as long as he is doing some research, no matter what, he
is engaged in a worth-while activity. As a result, research projects remain unrelated and disparate, and there is no sense of an organic accumulation of knowledge, carried forward from stage to stage, the hallmark of the natural sciences. What is worse, many of these factomaniac
researches come to have a disturbing and profoundly saddening air
of futility about them. A fact is a fact only in the context of a theory.
Countless events constantly occur and disappear in this vast cosmos of
ours, and we never take any notice of them. It is only when one of
them attracts our attention and comes to be considered interesting and
worthy of our notice that it appears as a fact, an event invested with
an interest and endowed with an intellectual dignity. As all judgments
of worth and significance presuppose criteria, which in turn presuppose a general theory of the area concerned, if theoretical homework
is poorly done, our judgment and treatment of facts suffers. We tend
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to introduce shaky assumptions and poorly analyzed concepts, and ask
muddled questions. The "facts" we thus collect and the relations we
establish among them are therefore dubious and cannot be accepted by
a serious theorist who, when these facts are relevant to his theory, will
have to conduct the same inquiry all over again. This never happens
in the natural sciences, where the researcher is not afraid of general
theory, where so many established general theories are already available, and where, over the course of years, criteria of significance have
been so securely and clearly evolved. There is widespread danger of
waste and triviality in the social sciences, though again, not in all of
them. It occurs less often in fairly well-established disciplines like economics than in relatively young, theory-suspicious and somewhat timid
fields of political science, experimental psychology and social science.I
A political scientist who researches into the dressing habits of politicians, a psychologist who asks what annoys people, and comes up, after
several years of indefatigable research, with a list of fifty-five different
things ( such as a badly shaped beard, a hair in their food, and a fly on
their plate), and a social scientist who, with the help of half a dozen
research assistants, inquiries into the washing habits of the workingclass women of a particular area in a small town, are all engaged in
activities whose point is hard to see. Of course, no research in itself is
trivial, but nor is it, in itself, significant. Like stones that a geologist
collects, facts have to be seen in a context, and the context for all significant inquiries is their theoretical interest. Thus, for example, the research on the washing habits of the working-class families could become very interesting if one were trying to test, say, the theory that the
working classes are the least mechanized section of the society; and
similarly the research on the causes of annoyance could become interesting and worth-while if, for example, it was aimed at exploring the
differences between the character of social classes or nations, or at
examining the historical memories of the community that lead it to
associate a hair or a fly with certain unsavory historical episodes, or at
considering if the absence of a clear target in an increasingly bureaucratic society means that anger, a clearly directed emotion towards a
specific object, degenerates into a diffused and grumbling annoyance.
The point can be put schematically. Of any research one wants to
ask and ought to be able to answer the following questions: First, what
theoretical interest or problem has inspired this research? Second, what
sort of general theory is it likely to give 1;se to? Third, is it likely to
give rise to, to open up, a range of other interesting problems? If it
fails on anyone or more of these three counts, its value is immediately
suspect.
The decline of the intellectual

By intellectual I understand a person who takes a sustained and
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knowledgeable interest in the problems of his society and civilization.
His primary concern is to understand, preserve and enrich his civilization, whose ideas and values he articulates, refines and even creates.
Any inquiry that has anything relevant to contribute towards the
understanding of man and society has an interest for him. The findings
of the natural sciences interest him if they throw light on the evolution of man, or on the possibility of the extinction of the species, or
on the development of new technology, or on the way organized social
life is lived. And similarly he takes a keen interest in the findings of
other technical inquiries like the social sciences, philosophy and history.
On the basis of the ideas drawn from various fields he constructs a
synthetic perspective on his civilization. He may be a specialist in one
particular area as well, but he need not be, and in any case it is not
his scholarship that makes him an intellectual. Besides, though deeply
interested in his society, he need not necessarily be politically active,
although he might be if he thought it necessary. He inhabits that intermediate realm between pure theory and practice: he is interested in
ideas but only as they relate to the organized social life; and unlike
a politician he is interested in society not necessarily with a view to
political action but primarily in order to preserve or change the ideas
that dominate the consciousness and influence the behavior of his society. He is a custodian and a critic of the ideas and values, in a word,
character, of his society and civilization. He studies it, defines, criticizes and re-creates it, exposes what is evil and humbug in it and defends and stands up for what is valuable.
In the past, the role of the intellectual was played by a number of
groups, prominent among which were philosophers, theologians, historians and literary figures. Each wielded a distinctive and powerful
medium of communication and a unique type of moral authority. The
theologian spoke and acted on the basis of the deeply held religious beliefs of the members of his society, and commanded their reverence.
The philosopher's strength lay in the realm of the intellect. He was
regarded as someone who synthesized all arts and sciences into an intellectually fascinating weltanschauung. He thus wielded a type of
authority over his contemporaries that came from their admiration
and awe. The historian was seen as a person who explored the origins
of his civilization and who therefore commanded respect for his deep
familiarity with the inner springs of his society. He pointed out the
great men of the past for his contemporaries to emulate; he drew lessons from the past, and dug out historical parallels for contemporary
problems. He was thus expected to inspire, guide, advise, and caution.
As for the literary figures they explored the deepest emotions of the
human mind; and revealed and immortalized the anxieties and hopes
of their society in a way that no one else could, and earned its affection
and love. When all the four groups pulled together their energies and
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different types of authority in a concerted attack on a society or a
civilization, it was doomed.
In recent years a remarkable change has occurred that can only be
described as the replacement of the intellectual by the expert. As this
question is of considerable importance, it would be helpful if we first
distinguished among a professional, a specialist and an expert. A professional is a person educated for a particular calling, for a particular
profession, like that of a lawyer or a priest. He has acquired the body
of knowledge deemed necessa1y by his society for undertaking a socially
useful activity. His is a social activity and involves dealing with other
human beings. It, therefore, raises not only technical but also larger
moral and other questions from which it can never be fully emancipated. A doctor does not deal with patients, but with men who have
fallen ill, and therefore has to consider several non-medical questions.
Further, though the professional activity could thus in principle touch
every aspect of life, it is specific and determinate and his a definite objective and locus. A doctor may have to know my financial situation,
my business worries and the health of my parents, but his main concern is to cure a disease I may be suffering from. Among other things,
this is what distinguishes a professional from an intellectual who has
a wider range of interests and who studies his society as a whole and
not from the standpoint of a specific professional activity. This is why
the expression "a professional intellectual" is somewhat odd. Again,
though the professional activity is a source of livelihood it is much
more than that. It is also a vocation calling for certain definite
standards of honor and integrity that are generally enforced by professional associations.
Within the complex of activities a profession involves, a person
might choose to concentrate on one. A lawyer might decide to make
an intensive study of constitutional or tax law, just as a medical student might decide to specialize in cardiology, and a historian in the
nineteenth century. Such a specialist continues to operate within the
larger context of the profession, but his narrowness of concern introduces certain significant changes. As his activity does not cover the
entire range of the profession, his interest in the larger issues of his
profession is likely to be less than that of the general practitioner. A
tax expert for the most part may be a consultant, and his contacts
more with his fellow-professionals than with ordinary men. This tends
to restrict his range of sympathy and to dilute his interest in the conditions in law courts or in the relations between the lawyer and his client.
However, with all his limitations, a specialist is still a professional, and
the difference between the two is largely one of de~ree.
With the expert one notices a change of kind. He shares with the
specialist his narrow range of interest, but beyond that they part company. An expert is someone who knows, or believes he knows, or is be-
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lieved by others to know, everything about a particular activity. He
wants to, and is expected to, offer "solutions" to problems. His interest
is only in the problem, not in the men who are faced with it. (Generally he is not himself in the position of having to decide a particular
matter, but is someone to whom we turn to tell us what to do in a
given situation.) Indeed, if I started explaining to him the human
context of the problem he would consider it improper and a waste of
his time. His activity thus is purely technical and raises, in his mind,
no broader questions. Knowledge appears to him as a cluster of techniques to be applied to solving problems. He is, in his own view, a
purely cerebral being in whom irrelevant human emotions have been
dried out and who is guided only by the logic of his techniques; he is
the sustaining spirit of the technological age.
In the university today, the trend is in the direction of increasing
specialization. In a sense it began in the middle ages when the universities grew out of professional schools2 and took it as one of their
main objectives to prepare students for a specific calling.3 However as
befits a professional body, they continued to emphasize the general
instruction on life and society, and insisted on a thorough grasp of all
the various aspects of the professional activity. A medical student, for
example, generally studied theology, classics, and everything about the
human body. During the last few decades, partly because of the intense
division of labor required by the advanced industrial society, and pa rtly
perhaps because of the feeling that one lacks a clear professional and
even personal identity unless one is engaged in an unambiguous and
neatly defined work, professionalism has begun to give place to specialization and the tendency of a scholar is to carve out a little area and
concentrate on it. His ambition is to know as much as his talents permit about that area. As a specialist, he feels he should keep himself
familiar with the latest literature in his field and this takes up so much
of his time and energy that he feels he cannot sustain an interest in any
other area. As for the larger issues of his society and civilization, he believes they must be left to appropriate specialists. He is personally not a
specialist on these matters and therefore fee ls his opinions have no
particular value. And in any case, he believes his scholarly objectivity
and detachment require that he should not get involved in situations
that require him to take sides and fight passionately for causes.
For those specialists whose specialty relates directly to the activities
of society, the temptation has been the opposite. Believing like good
behaviorists that their knowledge can be reduced to techniques, believing like good liberals that their society has solved the fundamental
problems of ideological differences, and believing like good specialists
that all problems can be best solved singly and individually, they have
begun to set themselves up as experts. Politics, like anything else, is for

96

them a matter of solving isolated problems in the light of available
techniques.
As experts they feel they know the solution of a problem, and that
when they do not, nobody else is likely to know about it either. It is
all a matter of time before they have worked out an answer, and therefore all they need from others is faith a nd patience. When confronted
with critical a nd "noisy" groups who demand radical changes, an expert's attitude is either to dismiss them as stupid and gullible m en who
are led on by others, or to see his troubles as a problem in the failure
of communication a nd therefore needing to be solved by a better
public relations exercise. His tendency is " to get on with the job" and
to forget the trivi al, impatien t a nd unintelligent inter ferences by dissident and critical groups. As he does not belong to or act in concert
with any organized group, the expert believes tha t he is not a "mass
man" ; and since he is thinking solely in terms of objective and scientific techniques, he believes he is disinterested, has no axe to grind , and
cannot but be right. His ultimate hope is to create a society ruled by
experts like himself. Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool outlines "the skeletal
structure of a new society" in which the leadership will rest "with the
research corporation , the industri al laboratories, the expe rimen tal stations, and the universities," with "the scientists, the ma thema ticians,
the economists, and the engineers of the new computer technology."
He goes on, " not only the best talents, but eventually the whole complex of social prestige a nd social status, will be rooted in the intellectual a nd scientific communities."4
Now all this is clea rly untenable. It is true that the conduct of
political life does require taking technical decisions, and tha t therefore
it requires specialist advice. But there are no political or economic
experts, persons whose technques deliver correct solutions to all questions. Political and economic decisions require weighing countless
factors that cannot all be quantified; since many unexpected factors
intervene in a n unpredictable way, what is needed is an intuitive grasp
of the situation, a feel for its uniqueness. And this is not a matter of
expertise. Again, politics is not simply a ma tter of taking- correct decisions but right decisions- tha t is, decisions in accord with the values
and preferences of the community. And these are the elements that inevitably escape from the expert's net. Further, one of the crucial
characteristics of a political decision is tha t it should win the approval
of the people. And this means persuading them, educating them into a
different sense of values from what they are used to, and inspiring
them to do things they normally would not. All this requires tha t a
politician should be in tune with his time, should be sensitive to
cha nges in popular feelings, a nd should have tha t ind efin able quality
of character tha t inspires trust. Expert knowledge is no substitute.
Again, as recent events have shown , it is tota lly wrong to suggest that
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any of the modem soc1et1es has solved the fundamental problems of
organized social life. Even when dissidence is not openly expressed,
there remains a deep malaise in the "silent majority." Thus some of
the fundamental premises of the rule by expert are mistaken.
In defense of the expert's close cooperation with government departments, it is sometimes argued that it "humanizes and civilizes" the
man of power and gives the expert a larger view of his society.5 This
almost amounts to cl aiming tha t the e>..- pert is an intellectu al, carrying
his civilizing mission into the da rk corridors of power. Nothing could
be further from the truth. Mere expertise, as we saw, involves the
elimina tion of the cha racteristic human emotions and choices. It is
ahuman, and cannot by definition humanize anybody. Besides, it is
often the government d epartment that absorbs the expert, silences
him by the demands for secrecy, overwhelms him by countless technical and burea ucratic objections, dazzles him into a false sense of selfimportance, and thus turns him into an administration spokesm an, incapable even of preserving the critical and civilized environment of the
university from the corrupting pressures of government.6
To argue tha t a collection of short-sighted experts can generate a
larger view of society is like a rguing tha t a collection of egoistic individuals can ta ke disinterested political decisions. Both rest on the same
liberal fallacy. Different expert views and standpoints reinforce each
other, or cancel each other out, or crea te a stalemate that is resolved
by a pragmatic compromise based on the pressures exerted by each of
them. Each expert is a purveyor of information and techniques and
not a source of crea tive insight, a nd therefore there cannot be among
them tha t dialectical and organic interplay of ideas from which alone a
broader perspecti ve can emerge. Wha t is more, as each expert qua
expert is committed to belief in the rule by experts and to the type of
society that m akes it possible, not so much because he is selfish as because this is what he considers objectively desirable, he can ha rdl y be
expected to be objective in his analysis of the society. And since the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts and since its logic is different
from that of its parts taken individually, dealing with each problem
individually and seeing it from a number of disparate angles means
that the basic problems of the society and the larger trends developing
in it go unexplored . In short, the role of the intellectual, of a person
viewing his society and civiliza tion as a whole, is extremely crucial a nd
cannot be fill ed by a number of one-eyed experts.
The decline of the intellectual in the modern society7 h as meant
that there is no knowledgeable group of persons to take an active a nd
intelligent interest in their civilization. Of the various groups from
which intellectuals were drawn in the past, only the religious leaders
retain something of their earlier concern, though their influence is
mu ch less, partly because of the increasing secularization of our age,
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and partly because they have lost a part of their earlier authority by
remaining silent when the forces of injustice and inhumanity had
raised their ugly head (as with the Catholic Church in respect to the
Nazis), or by positively supporting them ( as with the various Protestant
churches in respect to the apartheid in South Africa). As for the philosophers, they feel that they are engaged in a highly technical inquiry
that has nothing to say on human affairs. As for the historians, they
believe they study the p ast for its own sake and that therefore they
have no lessons to teach. Literary figures do retain some degree of social and political concern, but their tendency is to put technique and
form over substance, and craftsma nship over the deeper exploration
of the huma n mind.
Sometimes these inhibitions of the scholars are ra ther lightly
brushed aside by impa tient critics. It is suggested, for example, that
a historian today is not doing his proper job and that he should instead
be inspiring a nd guiding us by drawing examples and parallels from
the past, or tha t a political philosopher should be primarily concerned
with constructing utopias and furnishing prescriptions. This is a mistake, as it takes a very questionable view of the nature of the academic
di sciplines concerned and of the relationship between theory and
practice. It implies, for example, tha t a prescription for a specific and
unique practical situation can be deduced from highly abstract and
general theories. And this is surely wrong. The scholar contributes to
the better understanding of his society not so much by applying to it his
specialized findings as by bringing to the study of it a quality of mind
that is critical, detached and sensitive to certain types of problems.
Thus a historian who takes an interest in his civilization, and is thus an
intellectual, sustains and enriches it not primarily by giving some examples and parallels from the past-though he may if there a re anybut rather by bringing to it a historical approach, a mind accustomed
to viewing problems against the backdrop of the past. And this is true
of political philosophers, sociologists, theologians, physicists, a rtists,
economists, and others as well. Each has a certain perspective, a certain sensitivity and therefore illuminates his civilization in his own
uruque way.
The gap left by the decline of the intellectual in the life of the community h as come to be filled by a mixed bag of journalists, retired politicians, party political ideologists, and television and radio commentators, not many of whom h ave any theoretical and historical understanding of their society a nd civilization, or any time or ability to
reflect on them in a detached and critical manner, and whose views
therefore generally spring from nothing more elevated than common
sense prejudices. As the existence of the civilized community is the very
precondition of scholarship, our conception of the la tter needs to be
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expanded so as to facilitate and encourage the growth of th e intellectual. If it is the specialist who fertilizes the intellectual by his findings, it is the intellectual who a ttends to the basic cultural conditions
of scholarship and makes the scholar aware of those larger social and
political assumptions and implications of his work that he is in constant danger of overlooking.
Academic scholarship and ideology
As we h ave seen, intense specialization leads to a decline of interest
in other disciplines than one's own as well as in the larger issues of
one's society and civiliza tion. One of the consequences of this is that
a specialist does not generally confront a situation where he is required
to examine the assumptions on whi ch his discipline rests. H e applies
the tools and methods of his craft that he h as picked up during the
course of his professional training a nd his faith in which is constantly
reinforced by the imposing consensus professionals tend to build up
through inertia, timidity a nd the common habit of citing each other's
work.8 Indeed, often the tools and methods of a discipline a re so
closely identified with the discipline that it is defin ed in terms of them.
Economics may be defined as a science studying the allocations of
scarce resources, so tha t anyone who questions the assumption of
scarcity is rega rded as not doing economics a t all! Similarly, politics
may be defined as persuasion and concilia tion, so tha t revolution, assassination, and acts of violence are not politics a t all. By common consensus a particul a r way of practicing a discipline comes to be recognized as legitimate and a nyone questioning them or practicing a discipline in a different way is regarded as professionally illiterate, needing
further professional socialization. Now, of course, there is nothing objectionable in this .... Indeed a consensus among the practitioners of
a discipline is unavoidable and necessary, as otherwise it lacks a corpus
of tools and methods by which to define itself and into which to induct
its new practitioners. What is obj ection able is the subtle way in which
a consensus, here as elsewhere, can lead a discipline into a narrow a nd
rigid intellectual groove by preventing it from asking cri tical a nd
fundamental questions.
As a scholar's concepts and methods are derived from the existing
consensus, he comes to believe that these are the only ways his discipline can be p racti ced. He is thoroughly inducted into his profession
and, as befits a professional, h e has learned to rise above all personal
preferences and inclin a tions, to take no sides, a nd to put aside all passions and prejudices. He has also learned to collect facts with clinical
thoroughness, and to deal with them in a systematic and methodical
ma nner tha t is professionally approved . Since he thus lets "facts speak
for themselves" and does not interpose himself between the facts and
the conclusion they entail, it is only to be expected, he concludes, that
his judgments will be disinterested and objective. When therefore some100

one, usually a left-wing critic, questions his professional tools, and inquires if they do not spring from or involve social and political preferences, he feels outraged and tends to dismiss him as wanting to politicize and contaminate the pursuit of knowledge by raising the ideological dust that he himself has long since risen above.
And yet this is simply not true. If one carefully considers the way
he practices his discipline, one notices that it rests on a number of assumptions no less ideological than those of his critic, but which he has
failed to notice because he has imbibed them unconsciously and also
because, when articulated, they appear so self-evidently true to him.
Take the example of the studies of the developing countries. The very
language in which the latter are described is suggestive. Till about the
end of the nineteenth century, they were referred to as primitive. L ater
they came to be described as backward. After the second world war
when many of these countries became independent the terminology
began to change, and they came to be referred to first as undeveloped,
then as underdeveloped and lately as developing. In all these terminological changes one thing has remained constant, and that is a certain normative standard by which these countries are judged and
graded as developed, underdeveloped, and less or more developed.
This standard is predominantly economic, and is formu lated in terms
of a certain annual growth rate of the gross national product or of the
per capita income. Thus from the total social life of these communities
a single aspect is abstracted and treated as all important. It is, of
course, very important to eliminate poverty and to help people achieve
a certain level of comfort. However, other values like freedom, respect
for life, continuity in the historical identity of the community, longterm political stability, and social and economic equality are all no less
important. And therefore what is called for is a balanced growth of
the society as a whole of which economic growth is one important part.
If one inquires why the developmental analysis gives so much importance to the economic criteria one is led to a conception of man
and to a theory of social change on which their views rest. They seem
to believe like good liberals that man is essentially an economic being
who defines himself in terms of his status in the social economy and
whose dominant motivation is the accumulation of money. This is indeed how rationality is defined, a rational man being one who calculates, "weighs" pros and cons, and pursues the line of maximum gain.
This conception of man leads to the further belief that economic factors
are the sole or the most important determinants of social change,9 and
therefore, that once a country has reached an advanced stage of industrialization it will create a bourgeois-managerial class that will then
go on to sustain an appropriate political, moral and cultural system.
The implication therefore is that the first priority should be given to
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the fullest possible industrialization of these societies, unrestrained by
any other consideration.
When the criteria and indices of development born within the
framework of the economistic conception of man are applied to the
developing countries they lead to strange results. The behavior of their
inhabitants appears totally incomprehensible to the developmental experts. The Americans gave Kenyan fishermen motorized boats so that
they could explore hitherto unexplored fishing grounds to catch more
fish. The happy fishermen finding that they could now haul a day's
load in an hour enjoyed themselves the rest of the day. The Burmese
Buddhists, feeling that the inner tranquility and happiness was the
most important objective in life, resisted pressure to work hard to
make more money, to the utter frustration of the Americans. In the
eyes of the developmental experts, these men are "irrational," "backward," "pre-modern," "uncivilized." Their traditional society, seen as
the opposite of the modem society mustl, it is suggested, be destroyed
and modelled after the western society.
Further as the economic life in these countries is still immersed in
the social and religious structure, it does not have the autonomy and
independence it enjoys in the developed western society. And therefore
the conventional methodological tools, that presuppose individualistically oriented economy, and the conventional concepts like unemployment, maximization of utility, saving and accumulation of capital do
not make very much sense. In any attempt to apply the conceptual
framework rooted in the western e>..'Perience, the history of the community, its distinctive tradition, its past experiences, are rarely taken
into account; and it is not asked if perhaps different societies and cultures do not involve different conceptions of man and life, if the neat
contrast between the "traditional" and the "modern" society is really
tenable, and if the former must be destroyed in order for its people to
live a better life than at present.
The controversy about the criterialO of development does not remain merely academic. It comes to have disturbing practical results.
When most of the experts, government advisors, and the shrewd politicians in the developed western world are all agreed that this it what
development consists in, the recipient country accepts it as its ideal and
concentrates exclusively on achieving the magic figure of economic
growth, distorting in the process its moral, political, cultural and other
values. If the increase in population hinders economic growth or shows
that per capita income is rising less fast, it feels it must reduce its
population at all cost, even by forcibly arresting and sterilizing men
as has happened in India in recent years. Conditioned by these criteria
the country concerned feels it cannot maintain its self-respect, and cannot please its donors and cannot earn good marks from international
developmental experts unless it keeps showing good economic results.
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The donor country for its part directs its aid to those that have reached
or are reaching a stipulated growth rate and whose citizens are beginning to show signs of economic "rationality."
In all these and other ways, the consensus on the definition of development becomes a means of influencing people's behavior in a certain definite direction. The ethnocentricity of the definition goes unnoticed, and so does the fact that the developmental analysis is becoming a subtle and effective, if unwitting, instrument of imposing the
bourgeois-liberal conception of man on nearly three quarters of mankind. Not just foreign aid but apparently well-meaning and politically
neutral academic disciplines become a means of molding a large part
of humanity in the image of the western man.
Similar ideological assumptions also underlie economics, sociology,
philosophy, history, psychology, anthropology, political theory and a
number of other larger and smaller fields of inquiry. Take an example
of political philosophy. Many political thinkers regard "why should
I obey the state" as one of the fundamental questions of political
philosophy. I I Now they are obviously right, and indeed they belong
to a tradition that goes at least as far back as Hobbes. But if one considers the question a little further, one detects a number of questionable
assumptions underlying it. It implies that the state is an entity existing
independently and outside of its individual members, rather than that
it is, as Rousseau said, simply a certain mode or level of individual
consciousness so that it exists, is realized, only in and through the actions of its members. The question assumes, further, that it is my
status as a subject and not as a citizen that is really the center of interest,
since otherwise we should ask not why I should obey the state but
rather what we should do as citizens to make it a better state. Instead
of saying that one is obeying a law, one might want to say that one is
supporting and affirming it; and one might feel that one's relation to
the state is not simply or primarily one of obedience but rather of actively participating in its affairs, proposing new policies, and standing
up for politically right causes. It assumes, again, that the question
of political obligation is asked and answered by an individual deliberating in his sovereign isolation, rather than that the decision has
to be taken by us as a community and therefore by "me" as one unit
in "us." That is to say, it assumes that "I" is politically speaking prior
to "we" and that "we" is a plural of "I," rather than that it is "we"
that is prior and that "I" is only a singular of "we." If this were realized
one might prefer to ask how we as a community should respond to a
law and what obligations devolve on me as a member of it. One might
even ask if it is proper to speak in terms of political obligation, since it
has a legalistic connotation and therefore refers only to those actions
that can be exacted on pain of punishment and not to those as well
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that are expected of a citizen in any civilized and politically educated
community. One might therefore choose a wider term, political duty.
If these and several other assumptions underlying the problem of
why I should obey the state, are clarified, one finds that this is a question that could arise only in a society that is suspicious of the state, that
draws a neat distinction between the individual and the state and regards law and liberty as essentially antithetical, that confines politics
to the politicians, and that regards the individual as essentially a
private and not a public being who finds politics somewhat uncongenial and unnatural and who therefore judges it by the strictest
standards of personal utility. That is to say, it is a question that acquires its meaning and urgency largely within the context of liberal
ideology. Not that it is an unimportant question but that in a different
conception of man and society it would be seen as part of a larger
question like what a citizen should do to make his community a much
better society than it is, or, to use a somewhat clumsy expression of G.
E. Moore, what he could do to maximize the political good.12
Again, take social psychology. Many works in the field hold up as
ideal the normal man, defined as one who is well-adjusted to the existing society, who is "socialized," straight, correct. What this often
means is that a strong and passionate expression of opinion, a display
of anger and indignation, a resolute refusal to compromise, and
tenacity in the pursuit of an unpopular cause come to be seen as a sign
of abnormalcy, of mental disturbance, and in need of treatment. A
Lenin or a Nasser or a Castro is then seen as a crank or a psychopath
and that is the end of him. It is not considered important to take his
criticisms seriously; instead a research is made into his childhood experiences to trace the "causes" of his "abnormalcy" ! When Bertrand
Russell died, a distinguished commentator argued in a long article in
a British national daily that Russell's championship of various causes,
like the unilateral nuclear disarmament, the Vietnam war tribunal and
the democratization of the university-the causes the commentator
did not like at all-was due to his acute feeling of loneliness, generated
by the absence of love and intimate friends in his childhood! The students of Nantes felt so strongly about the ideological nature of social
psychology that they boycotted their psychology lectures on the ground
that the total rejection of it was the only way to reaffirm personal
liberty and respect for critical thought.13
These and other examples show how scholarship can become rather
narrow, uncritical, restrictive, even suffocating, and at times subtly manipulative. It can reinforce a particular structure of beliefs and preferences and dismiss others out of hand. The question we should consider
now is what follows from this realization and recognition of the possible ideological assumptions and implications of the academic pursuits.
Some skeptics have suggested that as all knowledge is inherently
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ideological, we can never reach the truth, and that therefore the very
pursuit of knowledge and truth is ultimately illusory. This is clearly
wrong, as it is like saying that no man should try to be good or better
because he can never be perfect. Though absolute knowledge is impossible, it does not mean that one conclusion cannot be judged better
or more reliable than another. We can, and do, judge and arbitrate
among various views in terms of their consistency and the arguments
and the evidence that can be produced for and against them.
Relativists take the view that as all knowledge is ideological, one
conclusion is as good as another and that the truth ultimately depends
on one's standpoint and preference. This too is a mistake. Like the
skeptic's argument it implies that one view cannot be judged as better
or more tenable than another, and this is simply not true. Besides, it
fails to see that the existence of several ideologies, far from leading
to a relativist take-your-pi ck situation, is one of the very preconditions
of intellectual progress. It enables us to consider a problem from a
number of perspectives and thus to perceive the contributions and limitations of each by requiring it to take account of the criticisms made
by others.
Marcuse has taken a third, almost totally opposite, view that it is
possible to reach the truth that is free from all ideological conditioning,
and that therefore we are justified in suppressing the mistaken and
ideological bourgeois works of scholarship. As he says,
the restoration of freedom of thought may necessitate new and
rigid restrictions on teachings and practices in the educational
institutions which, by their very methods and concepts, serve to
enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse
and behavior-thereby precluding a priori a rational evaluation
of the alternatives. And to the degree to which freedom of
thought involves the struggle against inhumanity, restoration of
such freedom would also imply intolerance toward scientific research .... I shall presently discuss the question as to who is to
decide on the distinction between liberating and repressive,
human and inhuman teachings and practices; I have already
suggested that this distinction is not a matter of value-preference
but of rational cri teria.15

He is restrained in his argument and suggests no more than that the
liberating intolerance could be enforced in the university by teachers
and students voluntarily refraining from teaching and learning the
bourgeois works of scholarship. Not unexpectedly, some of his followers have taken this to be a plea for wrecking lectures and threatening
teachers and burning books. They have even implied that the "bourgeois" standards of scholarship should be ignored and even positively
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violated, and that books should be judged "good" or "great" in proportion to the goodness of the cause they propound.
Now this, what one might call, academic antinomianism is clearly
untenable. Marcuse's argument rests on the belief that he has grasped
the absolute truth, and this is a very tall claim to make, particularly
for M arcuse who often takes notorious short cuts to his conclusions,
and does not produce much empirical evidence for his views and closely examine and refute the likely objections of his critics. He writes
more like a prophet revealing an apocalyptic vision than like someone
undertaking a rational evaluation of the alternatives that he himself
talks about in the remarks quoted above. But there are more basic objections. M arcuse fails to notice the difference between the university
and the political society at large, or what is the same thing, between
the academic and the political freedom. One can imagine situations
where the expression of certain views may have to be suppressed in
the political realm in order to forestall certain practical consequences.
Thus, for example, Marcuse's idea of liberating intolerance makes
sense in the political li fe where untouchability or racialism or fascism
may have to be forcibly put down and their advocacy forbidden, when
they are no longer a freak and marginal social phenomenon, and where
their political exploitation can seriously frustrate the good work done
by the government. Indeed, there is hardly a liberal society that allows
freedom to incite racial or communal hatred. But the case of the university is very different, it being a place where these and such other
views are discussed at the academic and the theoretical levels, where
immediate practical consequences are not likely to follow, and whose
members are used to listening to, and indeed trained to listen to and to
deal good-humoredly and critically with, eccentric and extreme views.
And therefore a discussion, even a sympathetic discussion, of even the
most bourgeois and abominable doctrines cannot be restricted in the
university.
Again, Marcuse like any other philosopher is not a disembodied
mind, and it is he, and not his mind, that thinks. And therefore his
interests, hopes, fears, unconscious biases, prejudices, preferences would
certainly tend to enter into his thinking and influence his initial choice
of premises, concepts and methods, and the reasons he finds persuasive.
As concrete and determinate creatures born at a specific historical time
in a specific society in a specific family, men are conditioned socially,
culturally, biologically, historically and in a variety of other ways; and
therefore cannot aspire to an absolute knowledge, a knowledge that is
totally liberated from all possible assumptions and presuppositions.
Further, with all his shrewd understanding of the Hegelian dialectic,
Marcuse here seems to understand negation as an abstract and blanket
rejection of what exists, since otherwise he should know that the less
ideological scholarship can emerge only by subjecting the existing
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" bourgeois" scholarship to continual and rigorous criticism. Finally, in
suppressing views that disagree with his, Marcuse forecloses the possibility of rational debate and intellectual growth, since it is only by
criticisms made from other perspectives that the limitations inherent
in one's own becomes noticeable.
None of these three approaches-skepticism, relativism, or the Marcusean absolutism-provides an answer to the question posed by the
ideological assumptions lurking underneath many academic disciplines.
Central to scholarship are the two general beliefs that we noted above:
man is a conditioned being who can never claim absolute validity for
his knowledge, and, second, he can constantly strive to improve and
refine his knowledge. One gives humility, and the other confidence, to
the academic enterprise. As it is only by constant and rigorous criticism
that scholarship improves and becomes self-critical, the answer ultimately lies, to reiterate a commonplace, in institutionalizing rational
criticism, so that we are constantly required to search and defend the
hidden assumptions of our methods and questions and concepts.
Further, if the criticism based on a different ideological standpoint
from the one currently practiced is to have a persuasive and constructive tone, it must express itself in substantial works of scholarship. A
scholarly work like Macpherson's analysis of the bourgeois social assumptions of Hobbes and Locke, or like Lucas' or Sartre's critical
analysis of the nineteenth century literature, does a lot more to question the established canons of scholarship than a polemical but ineffective diatribe.
As we observed earlier, part of the reason why ideological assumptions go undetected is that many academic disciplines are approached
in a highly specialized way. A narrow area of knowledge cannot be
cultivated without taking some account of the larger field of which it
is a part. And when this larger field is not cultivated and when general
theories and paradigms are not developed the specialist tends to pick
up the conventional assumptions and commonplaces about it. A specialized discipline is therefore in constant danger of becoming pedestrian
and n aive unless it constantly raises larger questions about itself. Since
this requires a philosophical interest and orientation, social sciences
at least could never be divorced from philosophy. Science-philosophy
distinction, when carried too far, trivializes social sciences and emasculates philosophy.
We saw earlier how academic scholarship has in many cases come
to rest on the questionable analysis of the concepts of objectivity and
truth. Objectivity does not arise from letting facts speak for themselves. Facts are mute and have to be interpreted. And interpretation
involves a theory in the construction of which the theorist's value
judgments unavoidably enter. Objectivity therefore does not mean
mechanical impersonality, as that is simply impossible. Sometimes it is
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suggested that the only notion of objectivity that is appropriate to the
study of man, and even to that of nature, is the one that involves an
impartial consideration of the relevant evidence, and the willingness
to look out for new, and in particular, inconvenient evidence and
arguments and to change one's views when shown to be wrong. However, even the notion of impartiality needs to be tightened up further
if it is not to conceal the grossest partiality. What is to count as
evidence, and by what criteria we are to decide what evidence is
relevant, are questions that need to be answered first before the "impartial consideration of relevant evidence" can be accepted as an indication of objectivity, since they are most likely places through which
partiality can smuggle itself in. A specialist may collect all his evidence with clinical thoroughness, but if his framework is restricted and
biased from the start, his so-called impartiality conceals a partiality.
For example, a historian who thinks he is only collecting "all the facts"
without any prejudice or preference may, in fact, be smuggling in most
insidious prejudices. And even if he does not, his very assumptions that
all facts are equally significant, that knowledge has no relevance to
human needs and that he, personally, does not wish to make any difference to the world around him by his research, are themselves normative assumptions that he has unconsciously imbibed from his likeminded fellow-professionals. The refusal to make judgment is, itself, a
judgment. It is a mistake to believe, as do many psychologically naive
social scientists, that partiality occurs only when a choice is made consciously, and that if one picks up problems and facts immediately one
cannot be partial.
Objectivity does not rule out passion or interest either, since they
often dispose one to look out for new problems and assumptions. For
example, a person who feels passionately about a particular reform is
likely to be very sensitive to the inarticulate assumptions underlying
the defenders of the status quo. As long as passion does not generate
bias and close the mind to inconvenient evidence. it is not a vice. And
if one considers scholarship not at the individual level but from the
standpoint of the discipline as a whole, even a bias is an advantage, as
it not only makes novel criticisms of the way the discipline is practiced
at present but it also suggests new directions. A fascist, for example, is
clearly biased in his criticism of the liberal political theory, but he exposes some of its profound weaknesses and raises problems that are
generally ignored by its supporters.
Nor, finally, does objectivity mean neutrality or a lack of commitment, since after an impartial investigation a scholar may, and does
generally, come to a definite conclusion which he would then wish to
uphold. For example, after a careful examination he might come to accept, say, the Marxist analysis of society as far more satisfactory than
the liberal or the positivist analysis, and then go on to analyze specific
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problems in its light. He is no less objective than the mainstream liberal
social theorist. It is, of course, crucial that he should not press his
framework dogmatically into areas where it does not apply, and that
he should be alert to the evidence and arguments that may be made
against it. But to dismiss, as many are prone to do, a person as ideological, biased and unscholarly simply because he wants to examine the
economic and social assumptions made by a moral or a religious or a
political philosopher is hardly proper, as it is itself an assertion of dogmatic and ideological partiality.
In short, impersonality does not ensure impartiality, but often the
opposite. Nor does one need to be disinterested or dispassionate in
order to be objective. And further, as the standards of objectivity do
not spring from high heavens but are conditioned and tainted by the
limitations and preferences of the men who have evolved them, they
cannot be regarded as sacrosanct and used to beat down unfamiliar or
ideologically disagreeable works of scholarship. Thus the reappraisal of
scholarship that is ultimately needed is the reappraisal not just of
specific disciplines but also of the very nature of scholarship---of its
nature, its objectives, its standards, its criteria of truth and objectivity.
And this is a task that cannot be accomplished overnight but only over
the decades as audacious works appear that challenge the established
conception of scholarship both by criticizing it and by showing by
example how a richer conception of it is possible.
Finally, as scholarship is not a cerebral but a human activity that is
ultimately limited by the limitations of the men practicing it, and as
some of the elements of our thinking draw their strength and plausibility from our personal preferences and our social position, it is an
advantage for the development of a discipline if its practitioners have
diverse social backgrounds, as they would then bring different insights
and sensitivities. The radical critique is right to stress this point, since
a discipline can easily get inflexible, inbred and somewhat narrow
when all its practitioners share a common social background and similar social experiences. Intellectual openness and flexibility is not entirely unrelated to social openness and flexibility. And therefore the expansion of educational opportunities to cover those hitherto excluded
is desirable not only politically but also in the very interest of the
growth of scholarship.
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FOOTNOTES
I. Social science should be clearly distinguished from sociology, a discipline
with a longer history than it is given credit for and of which the modern
social science in some of its forms is a p ale ghost. Historically speaking.
sociology, whether in the hands of Aristotle or Montesquieu or Marx or
Mannheim or Weber or Durkheim, has always remained c losely connected
with philosophy, history and moral theory. When classical sociology was
dissociated first from history, then from philosophy, and then fin a lly from
moral theory as well the result was something resembling the modern social
science that lacks the sense of direction that only history can give, the
clarity of concepts and the consciousness of its assumptions that only philoophy can offer; and he capacity for evaluating the significance of facts. that
can come only from a moral theory.

2. The universities of Bologna and Paris grew out of the law and the theology
school.

3. An academic is a professional, and therefore not necessarily an intellec tual,
though he should be one.
4. Quoted by Prof. Chomsky, The New York Review of Books, January 2,
1969.

5. These are the views of Prof. Ithiel de Sola Pool, qu oted by Chomsky, ibid.
6. Senator Fullbright has recently argued how the universities, instead of
providing "any effective counterweight to the military-industria l complex"
have "joined the monolith, adding greatly to its power and influ ence." In
refusing to act "as responsible and independent critics of the government's
policies" they are "betraying a public trust," "The War and its EffectsII," Congressional Record, December 13, I 967.
7. This has happened in different d egrees in different countries. In France,

which has long enjoyed the glorious intellectual tradition, the intellectual
is still a fami liar animal. In England, the degree of profession alism is much
greater and there is a reluctance to undertake an activity that one cannot
pursue with professional seriousness and competence. The same tende ncy
prevails in America, though there are signs of change as more and more
academics, agonized by the Vietnam war, are beginning to ask searching
questions about the quality of life in their society.

8. For how this is done, see Christian Bay's "The Cheerful Science of Dismal
Politics" in Th. Rozzak, ed. The Dis~e nting Academy ( Pantheon Books,
1968), p. 220ff.
9. Much of this is also true of the socialists who thus combine with the
liberals in producing an almost universal consensus on the emphasis on
industrialization. After that, of course, the two part company.
10. In recent years, there is a trend in the direction of broadening the criteria
of development to include political and cultural elements as well. But even
here the basic western liberal bias persists. The two-party system, secularization, open bargaining, competing elite, socialization of the masses into a
rational-bureaucratic culture, absence of a strong ideological commitmentare all considered crucia l to political d evelopment. Indeed the term westernization is used synonymously with modernization, rationalization and
development. See Gabriel A. Almond and G . Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, L ittle Brown & Co .,
1966 ) , p. 61; and C. Ake , A Theory of Political Int egration (Dorsey Press,
196 7 ) , chs. 2 and 7.
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11. Even Sir Isaiah Berlin takes this view. See his "Does political th eory still
exist"? in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed., P. Laslett a nd W . Runcima n
(London, 1962 ), series II, p . 7.
12. Prof. Graeme Moodie has been helpful in fonnulating my ideas on this
question.
13. Gabrie l a nd D a niel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism, The L eft Wing
Al.ternative ( Penguin, 1969), p. 31.
14. Both the skeptica l and the relativist positions can be knocked down on
forma l logical grounds as well. Though the skeptic maintains th a t we can
never reach the truth, he is already claiming tha t we know at least this as
the truth ! Likewise, the relativist, while emphasizing the rela tivity of a ll
knowledge , asse rts at least this proposition as absolutely true ! And since
both of them thus recognize at least one exception, there is no reason why
they cannot admit others.
15. Robert Pau l Wolff, Barrington Moore, H erbert M arcuse, A Critique of
Pure Tolerance (Beacon Press, 1969 ) , p. 100£.
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Education for Wholeness
By

ARNOLD GERSTEIN

More and more, my commitment to teaching has come to reflect
what I am doing outside of the classroom. My idea of a life outside
the classroom dictates, to some extent, what I try to reconstruct in the
classroom. Martin Buber has called this "education of character." A
person with such an education, unlike the nihilist of today, would deny
no answer to life and the world, and would "accept responsibility for
everything essential he meets." 1 Education of character is the education for the unity of the person, life and action.
Up to now, we educators have delivered the individual (not a
person) into a professional skill (with its increment of higher status),
and triied at the same time to educate him in a liberal fashion. A liberally educated individual was conceived to be one who was better able
to take his place in the modern world. He was to be a kind of Mr.
Spock-a logical, rather perfect, guilt-free specimen of the species, a
well-adjusted individual. I think taking the Mr. Spocks and Captain
Kirks of our imagination as models encourages the false strength of
man, indeed, his very weakness and doubtfulness.
The questionable side of man, according to Buber, lies in man's
almost total inability to confirm his fellow man as what he is and wha t
he can become. To be a man (i.e., a person, not merely an individual ),
is to bring or fail to bring all our resources at any given moment into
our response to the demands of a concrete situation. The inability
to d o this is the source of our locked up potentialities and, when we
fail, of our feelings of real, "existential" guilt.2
This requires some translation. The education of character does
not mean the learning of maxims or habits and their inter-relation112

ships. It means not remaznzng in and with ourselves. In the context
of my teaching, it means not interfering with the independence of the
student to form and to ask questions about that which he wants to
know or become aware of now, that which disturbs or delights him
now, and that which he may come to know tomorrow. Interference
occurs when we manipulate the student to our way of seeing the world
and man, rather than opening him up and drawing him in. This is no
simple task since it involves fairly constant trust so the student can
become aware of the truth of the unity of the person, its integrity, the
unity of life and action, theory and practice, thought and feeling.
I must enter a demurrer at this point. The education of character
requires great modesty on our part, and the removal of irrational
guilt, when we fail. It is no easier, and certainly no less painful, to
change the nature of the classroom than to change our personality
or mentality from that of a slave to that of a free man. Moreover,
"neither the greatness that was Greece nor the grandeur that was
Rome was based m any way upon structures comparable to
universities."3
Are universities taking over the task of the family, the church,
the community at large? Are we attempting to help a person get
through the pain of a prolonged adolescence? If so, we must realize
our limitations. By the mere fact of keeping him in a university and
thus preventing him from assuming responsibility, we delay his growing out of adolescence. His initial and, perhaps, never to be regained
responsibility has been taken from him the moment he was removed
from work in society, given a special status of student, and separated
from society by the university. Prolonged schooling displaced the student from apprenticeship, and led to a "hardening of class lines, as
educational advantages accumulated in the upper bourgeoisie and the
professional and managerial strata." We are thus left with the social
problem of adolescence that was caused by detention in schools. The
detention was meant as a cure but has only made matters worse . The
university has become a service institution, a multiversity with all of
the corporate policies of an administrative bureaucracy, that leaves
the professor alone to do his work, with the student as his institutional
proletariat. 4
An additional reason for modesty is the fact that the student does
not center his life upon what happens in the classroom. He, moreover,
comes to us with years of experience, in and out of the classroom,
which are antagonistic to the task of education of character, though
perhaps not to education for a profession. They were years of boredom, self-indulgence, mediocre excitement, and very little real responsibility. Thus, he often comes to us as a dependent individual, and our
institution further encourages that dependence rather than fostering
other values. Consequently, our students, for the most part, are not
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inspired by hope or conscious of joy in the classroom. This is not surprising, since in private, they are burdened by anxiety which feeds
on their anticipation of and dependence on receiving affection or
recognition while not involved in freely giving it. The vain search for
recognition leads to competition or, paradoxically, to its avoidance in
the safety of despondency. In either case, the mystery of unity and the
beauty of courage and self-responsibility cannot emerge. Students
search for recognition by either aggressive assertiveness ( "I'll show you,
just try to teach me.") or excessive timidity ( the fear of losing whatever recognition or worth one already has). Teachers, too, contribute
to this by asserting their dominating position as an authority, or by
being so thoroughly non-directive as to appear lacking in self-confidence. I suspect that, here, too, the motives are the teachers' search
for recognition and love. In one way or another, all of us are involved,
at some time or another, with greater or less frequency, in the defense
of professional, individual, or institutional privilege and control in
order to effect change while preserving a tenuous feeling of "self."
Education Through Communion
The opposite of domination or control is trust. To trust means to
open up and draw in , to include the other person through an appreciation and understanding of how he is different from you. Finally, it
means allowing ourselves to be changed by him. This description also
points to the meaning of contact.
The generating of trust is necessary to the open pursuit of truth,
but it is only a means. Generating trust and the pursuit of truth are
often confused, especially now when the open classroom with its removal of boundaries between student and teacher is so popular. Trust,
for Carl Rogers and Martin Buber, at least, m eans regarding the
other person as an individual of unconditional worth, just as he is
now and as he yet may become. Change is built into the full acceptance of a person's actuality. Given trust, in this sense, he cannot
help but change. Thus, freedom, to be and to become, through trust
is the "tuning of the violin," "the run before the jump."5 If freedom
does not lead anywhere, if a student does not come to discover his
ability to confirm his fellow man as what he is and can become, no
learning takes place. A non-learning context is one in which we make
false, insubstantial claims for confirmation, claims lacking any relationship to being and becoming. In such a context, we ought not be
surprised if change does not occur, if students do not ask questions, if
they refuse curiosity. We must become aware of when we have failed
to confirm truly. For me, this failure is signalled by a feeling of being
off center, of pursuing vain motives, a nd, finally, of the recognition
of those motives together with the feeling of being off center.
Distance and R ei'ation
Trust generates contact between students and teachers and between
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student and student. We, thus, have a chance to glimpse real humanity
unfolding whenever the capacity for true confirmation occurs. From
the point of view of teacher and student, however, the value of communion can be realized only if reciprocal inclusion is avoided. Educating relationships are like doctor-patient relationships, and are as
difficult to maintain. They must be one-sided inclusions (the teacher
comes to help the student), in order to preserve the tension of discovery and surprise. The moment the student comes to experience
the educating process used by the teacher, the moment he becomes
aware of what is going on from the standpoint of the teacher, at that
moment, says Buber, the relationship is burst asunder or transformed
into friendship.6 By friendship Buber meant a concrete experience of
mutual inclusion-the other person experiences the effect you are trying to produce.
The teacher must hold the student at a proper distance (a one-sided
inclusion), so the student can come to hear himself, hear the logic
as well as the rhetoric of his thought, hear the content as well as
the process, hear the emerging gestalt as it emerges. The maintenance
of distance also helps me assume responsibility for either influencing
my students or merely listening without interfering in their lives. It
helps to keep me from achieving my own self-esteem by manipulating
them. Maintaining proper distance helps us to resist two dangers in
the classroom. One is the desire of the student to be dominated; the
other is our desire to dominate, our will to power in and of itself. 7
In both cases what must be relinquished is manipulation of the student
in the name of testing or reinforcing ( our or the student's) feelings
of self-worth and self-love. (Relinquishing manipulation and control
does not mean giving up self-assertion per se. ) Our failure to relinquish such control in the classroom is related to our failure to do so
outside the classroom. The balance between distance and intimacy
arises both spontaneously and from reflective thought. I can respect
the independence of the student, and my own as well, only if I resist
the subtlest forms of manipulation and control.
Achieving independence or individuality, however, does not yet
mean becoming human or a man. We do not yet have a person when
we have an individual. An individual may remain free, doing his own
thing, but yet be aloof, uninterested in accepting others as they are
or confirming them in what they are meant to become. Thus, a teacher,
as an individual, might merely be interested in professing his own
ideas and his own individuality and never become a man, a part of
humanity. If so, he is merely a professional acting out his role, refusing to admit the distance to which the student has entered his private
sector. This type of teacher cannot allow himself to be changed by his
students.
In a real meeting between two people both are changed. Even so,
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hopefully, we, as teachers, will not lose sight of our role of helping the
student, nor begin looking for help from, or seeking to be known by
our students. Above all, let it not become a battle over who can see
whom with less distortion. It easily can become so for a teacher who
is unaccustomed to accepting and confirming the student as a person.
Acceptance and confirmation is a delicate dynamic process learned
through repeated missing, through negative feedback. Simultaneously,
we must be with the student, and yet with ourselves; separate, but
involved.
Buber thinks we and the students are not equals, in a certain sense.
This may be hard to accept both by those who demand the removal
of all barriers, as well as those who will not remove any barriers. For
instance, when a student asks about my experience, my feelings, attitudes or judgments, I am tempted to tell him unless I realize that
the situation of detached presence ( on which the teacher-student relationship depends), may be destroyed. Many of us think we can generate trust in this way. Or we think we can come to be accepted by
the students. In either case, the motive may be our need for recognition. Such self-revelation ought not be made as a demonstration of
equality. It is legitimate, only if based on a desire to accept and confirm the student, and not to draw attention to ourselves.
The test of whether or not we are educating for character and
wholeness is our transcendence of personal or moral judgments when
we enter into conflict with our students. ,Vinning the confidence of
our students, however, does not mean winning their agreement. It does
mean carrying them through a conflict we have provoked by pointing
out a third direction.
For instance, if a student denies the universal validity of certain
norms (such as, "Thou shalt not bear false witness" ) because of certain conditions or qualifications ( such as, the survival of a people or
nation), no argument showing the validity of the norm would help
the student accept its validity. The student m ay be a product of a
certain temper and disposition in which eternal values have been replaced by faith in parties, groups, or some collective or movement.
Only if the educator can lead the student away from the trap of collectivism into selfhood can such a universal norm make any sense.
We can begin to talk about absolute values only if we have first illuminated the value of becoming an independent person, with all the
pain involved in that process.
This, however, presupposes a constant process of self-education. I
mean a process that stresses the value of and the relationship between
a unified person and a unified life. To suceed at this, the teacher
interested in education of character must become what he is talking
about. We are whatever we are doing. Noticing what we are doing,
( for instance, how often we interfere with the independence and re-
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sponsibility of the student), becomes an essential task for the teacher.
Being what we are talking about influences a student, more than anything else, to a pproach the objective we have in mind. When I am
off center, I find it very helpful to note what sort of gestures, tone of
voice or a rrangement of thought have contributed to the loss of an
effective dista nce with my students.
As a teacher, I must constantly ask myself: What sort of effective
power am I really giving to my students? What am I hoping to give
them? What motives have stood in the way of bringing my most genuine self to bea r in the classroom? In order to focus on these motives, I
find it useful to distingui sh between the process and the content of
what goes on in the classroom.
The content does not always pa rallel the way in which I am saying
it or presenting it. If the la tent message of the process a nd the expressed meaning of the content correspond, then we experience the
opposite of duplicity in our motives. Buber h as called this entelechy
the " hidden influence proceeding from integrity, which has its own
integrating force."
It is a very demanding task to remain the "unmoved mover," not
getting caught up in the disappointing or the pleasurable effect of
what we are doing. If we cannot maintain at least a good average of
non-interference, we will remain emotionally confused and ineffective.
W e will also cause our students to stay dependent on us or to rebel
against us, in anger or indifference.8
John Dewey defines education of character as training a person
to be a competent learner by supplying him with approp riate habits
a nd maxims. I , however, am interested in the slow or sudden
emergence, when the situation demands, of a powerful will of self from
a layer where the person assumes full and total responsibility. Actions
and a ttitudes emerge united from that layer in the act of accepting
responsibility for the claim made, on oneself, by any situation.9 Buber
suggests that we, as teachers, study the structure of great character in
order to learn how to elicit credible and desirabl e values in ourselves.
This will, also, help overcome our dependence upon the "collective or
individual Moloch" by revealing the source of such dependency-our
own painful relation to ourselves.
These young people, it is true, do not yet realize tha t their
blind devotion to the collective, e.g., to the party, was not a genuine act of their personal life ; they do not realize that it sprang,
rather, from the fear of being left, in this age of confusion, to
rely on themselves, on a self which no longer receives its direction from eternal values. IO
We must not be lured into yielding to our students', or our own,
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desire to relinquish responsibility, to remain passive, to be spaced out,
or to be comforted and loved. From this, as from all escapes, we can
only return angry, depressed and in despair. The educator begins his
task by recognizing the sterility and feeling of deprivation in the student and himself. These come from the inability and the weakness of
the individual who has ceased to "decide what he does or does not, and
assume responsibility for it. ..." 11
I want to emphasize, again, the importance of models. If we are
not aware of our own lacks, our own deprivation, and if we do not
manage to be less deprived than our students, we will never awaken
their consciousness to the value of becoming decisive and responsible
human beings. If we are unwilling or unable to do this, the only
alternative is to regard the unity of a person and of life as a futile,
romantic ideal. Unified and responsible persons are the prerequisite for
any transcendence of collectivism or individualism. Education of character is also education for community.
In experiencing the uncanny nature of inner personal unity we can
come to respect the mystery of unity in all its forms- unity between
people, with nature, or with the universe. The mystery of unity can
be witnessed in sudden, unpredictable moments of felt mutuality between persons during a brown-out, a tornado, in a bomb shelter, or a
thea ter, a concert hall. In these situations two people who never knew
one another are "ontically" involved in the unitary demands of each
situation. The dialogue between the two disappears when things return to normal. The mysterious experience of unity an d responsibility
is open to all of us at moments of self-transcendence if we can respond
to the essential demand of the situation. It foreshadows experiences ot
ultimate value between ourselves as persons and the intelligible cosmos.
And yet, at present such experiences are rare and tenuous because of
problems that overwhelm us and blind us from our integrating powers.
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Among the classic lore of the Middle East is an achievement which
has been called "the strangest in the history of metaphysics." The reference is to a body of popular jokes known collectively as The Subtleties of Mulla Nasrudin: 1 the adventures of a legendary Sufi master
who turns the most mundane of situations into occasions for teaching
what can be called the timeless lesson.
In one of the Mulla tales, the master appears in the guise of a
ferryboatman transporting a scholar across a piece of rough water.
\,Vhile attempting to create conversation, the Mulla chances to make
a grammatical error. "Have you never studied grammar?" asks the
scholar. "No," replies the Mulla. "Then you have wasted half of your
life," he admonishes. After a few moments of silence the Mulla turns
to his passenger: "Have you ever learned to swim?" "No," he answers,
"why?" "Because all your life has been wasted-we are sinking."
It is with a similar kind of sinking feeling that I approach discussions of aims and achievements in education. For, regardless of the
current flurry of excitement concerning new directions in teaching and
learning, I feel that we are still adrift and perilously off course when
it comes to assessing what is in our best interest. Almost everyone nowadays is talking about educational reforms and there is a good deal
of agreement that change must be in the direction of fostering more
humanistic, life-enhancing processes. More often than not, however,
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A version of this paper was presented at the College of Dupage , Glen Ellyn,
Illinois, on September 22, 1971 where, as a visiting scholar, Dr. Williams
addressed the College's annual Instructional Seminar.
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what we term bold new ventures into self-discovery, enhancement
of growth, or whatever phrase suits our taste, are actually old and quite
stale wines in new wineskins. An old saying I like very much is that
before we act in accordance with our best interests, we should be certain that we really know what our best interests are. Which is to say,
I believe we generally pay less attention to what is really worth teaching than we do to how to pull education off. In the same way, we fail
to see how difficulties encountered in designing pedagogical techniques
can be symptoms of a poorly comprehended purpose, a distorted view
of organismic processes, or both. As in logic, when a properly stated
problem is seen to contain, in part, its own solution, so also an educational philosophy, validly conceived, suggests its own pedagogical devices. The point being, that puzzling over how to teach in an effective,
humane and self-fulfilling way often results from having the sentiment
for a new education, but not an understanding of the immensely different ways in which we must first perceive ourselves, other people,
and the universal processes we call life. As the old saw goes, we seem
to know the words, but not the music. Accordingly, let us exercise care
in assuming that our innovative ideas about education are really innovative, and not just some reiterated themes of yesterday adorned
with the modish fashions of today's vocabulary.
Said all at once, the most difficult thing imaginable is to get outside ourselves long enough to discover a new perspective: one not dictated by preconceived notions of what that new perspective should be.
Like the frustrations experienced in a hall of mirrors, each new direction attempted brings us full circle to a familiar reflection. But this
dilemma is necessary only as long as we are forced to choose alternatives within the frame of a fixed world view. This world view which,
paradoxically, defines and predisposes each and every one of our attempts to get outside it is a mode of orientation which I will call the
operational mode. That is, we see life as progressing along a linear
dimension-past, present and future-such that whatever happens
next seemingly is, or should be, subject to predetermination and control. This is where we are most deeply in trouble. In fact, this is where
we are all quite insane, and in our lunacy would have our students
join us, for the reason that madness, like all misery, loves company.
For example, many educators are concerned about ways to integrate
cognition and emotion in learning experiences; but to me this is more
an indication of a worsening of symptoms than a reversal in a pathological syndrome. Over and over again it becomes apparent that the wish
to involve affective experiences is tainted by an ulterior motive: the
intention is not so much to include feelings, intuitions and instincts as
co-equal partners in existence as it is to further submit them, in perhaps a more sophisticated way, to the designs of an intellect that functions as if the world were nothing but a matrix of operational pro-
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cedures. While thinking we are stnvmg toward new depths in both
understa nding and realizing a richer, fuller existence, we nevertheless
insist that whatever this turns out to be must be manageable in the
way of prediction and control. A similar kind of problem was visualized nearly a century ago by Fredrich Nietzsche who wrote in his
Twilight of the Gods:
... what an atmosphere prevails among the scholars [Nietzsche
,says], what a spiritual desert, how lukewarm and complacent.
It would be a profound mistake to bring up German science
against me on this point-and a proof, besides, that not a single
word I have written had been read. For I have been calling attention for the past seventeen years, untiringly, to the despiritualizing influence of our present-day science industry. The hard
helotism to which the prodigious range of the contemporary
sciences condemns every individual scholar is the main reason
why the fuller, richer more profoundly endowed of our students
can no longer find appropriate education or educators. There is
nothing from which this culture suffers more than from a superabundance of pretentious corner-watchers and fragments of
humanity; and the universities ... are the real hothouses of this
kind of stunting of the spiritual instincts. All of Europe has already a realization of this: no one is fooled by our high politics . . . Germany is regarded, more and more, as Europe's
Flatland.2
Let us take special note of Nietzche's use of the phrase "hard
helotism" which he says "condemns eve1y individual scholar." Helotism refers to a system under which a nominally free social class or
religious, national, or racial minority is permanently oppressed and
degraded. How, we ask, can this be applied to our present discussion?
I ts relevance is seen in taking a deep and very penetrating look at
the assumptions we make about the way life is: those assumptions that
lie well benea th the level of immediate awareness, but, nevertheless,
shape the values, attitudes, and preceptions that constitute the life experience. We find within that remote sphere a critically delimiting
system of influences that dictates our understandings of the world in a
no less tyrannical manner than a Machiavellian prince who, spinning
his illusory web of freedoms and well-being, disguises the compulsions
embedded therein. But how is this brought about? It makes our heads
spin! How is it that even our most imaginative speculations and
altruistic efforts, virtually bubbling with expansiveness and free selfexpression, are nevertheless caught in the fabric of an illusion; one
we find so difficult to stand outside of long enough to perceive hitherto
unimagined possibilities? Joseph Campbell has provided us a glimpse
into this problem:
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First [says Campbell], we receive a religious training in coined
platitudes from a world as far from the modem as any could
possibly be; next, a so-called liberal arts education, by way of
lecture courses, seminars and quizzes, week by week: "great
books" summarized and evaluated, stuffed into emptied heads
as authorized information, to be signalled back, for grades; and
then the sciences-at the outer reaches of thought!-all taught
by sterilized authorities who, in those unrecapturable years of
their own youth, when the ears, eyes, and heart of the spirit
open to the marvel of oneself and the universe, were condemned
to that same helotism of which Nietzsche writes. There is no
time, no place, no permission-let alone encouragement-for
experience. And to make things even worse, along now comes
those possessed sociopolitical maniacs with their campus rallies,
picket-line slogans, journalistic ballyhoo, and summonses to
action in the name of causes of which their callow flocks had
scarcely heard six months before--and even those marginal
hours that might have been left from study for inward growth
are invaded, wrecked, and strewn with daily rubbish. It is hardly to be wondered that the young people of the world today look
a bit like rubbish-strewn rooms themselves, and in their
Dionysiac "trips" and "happenings" promise to match the
agapes of the early Christian Church.3
Can we see in these remarks a complaint similar to one I raised
earlier concerning an operational mode that so severely shapes our
experience and orientation to the world and ourselves? As I see it, this
shaping is so complete that even our most heroic efforts to shake things
loose results in getting them more up-tight. Frankly, my blood runs
cold whenever I hear educators talk about instructional objectives,
behavioral objectives and the like when, in the name of anything in
the least sane, natural or just humane, we should learn when to leave
people alone. If we wish to live, as one says, organically, let us understand that a basic principle of all life is a certain tendency toward inner
as well as outer symmetry. Which is to say, a striving to find one's own
center of balance, not one imposed by well-intentioned zealots whose
every attempt to make things better makes them worse.
What then, it will be asked, are the alternatives? What I propose
is a serious consideration of a rather strange sounding concoction
called "hermetic pedagogy."
Thomas Mann in the "Magic Mountain" [Joseph Campbell
goes on to say] makes a good deal of the term "hermetic pedagogy." The idea suggested is of a sealing-off from historical time
and an inward-turning to inward time: activation of the mind
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through appropriate influences from without, but then a response in terms of one's readiness and pace of growth, not the
needs, ideals and expectations of anyone else, any group, or any
so-called world. On the flatland life is reaction, whereas on the
timeless mountaintop-as in the alchemist's vas hermeticumthere can be fermentation, spontaneity, action as opposed to
reaction: truly what is meant by the term "education"
( e-ducare, "to lead or draw forth") as opposed to "inculcation"
(in-culcare, "to stamp in with the heel"). And, absolutely indispensable for any such development is that separation from
the demands of the day which all educators-until recentlyunderstood to be the first requirement for anything approaching
a spiritual life.4
There is much in Campbell's remarks for us to learn. Let me point
out, for example, a basic principle concerning actions and reactions
well understood by ancient alchemists and metal workers. That any
time one understakes a transformation of ores or other ingredients
into a different state, he is interceding in time. In other words, alchemists felt that ores left undisturbed in the earth's womb would
transform or "ripen'" according to their own temporal rhythms.5
Altering the process through intercession was equivalent, therefore,
to engaging in dreadfully serious and risky business, fraught with the
dangers of violating the cosmos itself and/or displeasing a god who
had set the whole thing in motion. Men of the twentieth century,
however, tend to disregard natural rhythms right and left, secure
in the notion that science can perform wonders and that anything
that goes wrong, science can set right.
In our educational enterprises also, we tend to blindly rush forth
to intercede wherever possible with a blatant disregard of any inner
process or harmony tha t follows a logic of its own, not that of the
ruling intellect. If we wish to intercede in the sphere of the emotions,
we had better respect its inner rules which are as different from the
logic of intellect as anything can be. Rail against the unscientific
sounding terms as much as one wishes, when we deal with so-called
emotions we also deal in the realm of instincts, intuitions, dreams,
myths and the rest of a greater part of ourselves that exists in a sphere
beyond the reach of grammar. As we look about at the shapes of our
lives and the environment we have plundered to nourish our powermad intellects, we wonder anew at the words of our mysterious ferryboa tman to the grammar-ridden scholar: "all of your life has been
wasted-we are sinking."
N eitsche, Campbell, and Mann have provided us with a hint for
escaping our dilemma. A prerequisite for getting on with hermetic
pedagogy is to desist in some maneuvers now under way. We must see,
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for example, that the several versions of "sensitivity" approaches to
education are laden with risks. If sensitivity groups actually dealt with
learning how to open one's senses to the world, this would be desirable;
but to my knowledge there is nothing particularly "sensory" in the
versions that invade the classroom. If anything, they tend to be
amateurish dabbling with emotions designed to "open people up." A
first principle of "hermetic pedagogy" is to respect a certain readiness
to respond in regard to a person's own pace of growth. That person's
pace. Let us, therefore, respect silence and allow people the right, so
important to their health, of remaining sealed up until their own
fermentation has taken place.
As a case in point, during the past few years I have had the opportunity of observing attempts by a number of university faculty to
bring about reforms in the structures and functions of general education. Moreover, in one way or another I have been in the thick of
proposing and carrying forward some experimental ventures. A valuable lesson learned so far is that one must keep a close eye on himself
while he looks to the welfare of others-that is, students. There is always, I have found, a great likelihood that the operations to which
one wishes to expose people are really hoped-for therapeutic procedures
which will benefit not the students, but the operator himself. This is
nowhere more apparent than in the proposals themselves: statements
of "philosophy" and "goals" of a general education. From one prospectus to another the purposes are stated in terms such as "living a
fuller life," "individual growth," "self-development," "compassionate
communication and relationship," and so forth. No one, least of all
myself, should quarrel with aspirations such as these. But to whom are
they directed? The students? Or ourselves? In other words, is there
any reason for thinking that faculty are just human enough to bear
some of the faults they see "out there" in the rest of society, and that
sensing a lack of development in themselves would have their students
play out a self-actualization drama in vicarious fulfillment of their own
wishes and needs? "Yes," one might reply, "that can be the case, which
is why we must learn and grow with our students!" Very well, I say,
let's do it ; but only after we have carefully considered some differences
between them and ourselves which can be quite imposing.
Specifically, can we safely make the general assumption that students are experiencing the same pace of development as ourselves,
and at the same ch aracteristic stage; that they are psychologically
ready for the sorts of engagements and ripenings we like to call selfactualizing? Or can many or most people (including ourselves) be
working through stages of individual development that, as Abraham
Maslow points out, are necessarily prior to the business of self-fulfillment needs.6 There are other needs, Maslow says, and these are:
1. physiological needs; 2. safety or security needs; 3. social needs; and
1
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4. ego needs. Each of these need levels must be met before higher level
needs come into operation. Yet we tend to disregard this rather common sense fact when drawing up our objectives for general education.
We assume, across the board, that everyone should be busily self-actualizing, while disregarding the possibility ( the likelihood!) that some
students may have pressing needs at the level of physiological necessities. More likely, especially with people born to poverty, they are
focused at the level of safety or security: simply searching for ways
to stabilize his environment and to keep and protect whatever physiological necessities he has. Even more likely, students in the late teens
and early twenties are, as at level three, preoccupied with social needs
such as for belonging, sharing and association, and for giving and receiving friendship and love. Most likely of all, particularly with the
earlier maturation of today's young people, they are relating to ego
needs such as self-confidence, independence, achievement, competence,
knowledge, status, recognition, appreciation, and respect from one's
peers.
Disregarding these obvious facts of life we go right ahead with our
high moralizing and poetic appeals to "hyperawareness," buttressing
our pedagogy whenever necessary with "sensitivity" sessions and "selfdefeating behavior" groups. While the simple fact may be that some
people are not ready to be "sensitive" and that they are "defeating"
themselves much less than suffering defeats at the hands of faculty
who set for them impossible goals. As if people didn't want to "peak
out" with genuinely human experiences! I think they do, but there
isn't a pedagogy in the world that can facilitate self-actualizing on an
empty stomach, amidst a threatening environment, without a minimum
of social relatedness, or in the absence of self-esteem and a relatively
secure sense of recognition-despite appeals to the contrary by presidents and faculty committees that have forgotten their own adolescence.
One of the most general requirements in a program of general education is, as I see it, a provision for letting people determine their own
needs and their own pace of development. How ludicrous is an assumption that we have to guide students toward self-developments at
the higher levels. Can we not see that each individual is already
"equipped" (something we think we should do for them) with what
it takes to engage in self-actualizing; nature has already provided integrations of cognition and emotion and inner-directedness and outerdirectedness. Our jobs would be easier if we understood that. What we
need to do is to provide whatever resources we can, furnish what insights we can muster, and create opportunities for development ( at any
level ) to occur, and then step aside. A suggestion: Instead of heading
our proposals for general education with "A general education
should ... " let us see what happens if we begin, "The most a general
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education can accomplish is ..." In general, let us get off students'
backs with our imposed "needs, ideals and expectations" stemming
from "anyone else, any group, or any so-called world." I will add to
this list "or any so-called environment," which brings me to a second
point.
I believe we are long overdue in taking a serious accounting of the
rapid rise and spread of operant conditioning. Like any scientific
enterprise there is a recognizable contribution that can be made, but
the disciples of Behaviorism are going mad with power. It is their good
fortune, and our bad, that their modus operandi fits so snugly in the
operational, technological, machine-minded ethos of the modern world.
They offer a way to do it, and for addicts of so-called social progress,
the Siren's call of their hardware and push-button behavior modification is too much to resist. If there is or should be a pill for every
physical ache, it stands to reason, we feel, that any form of unhappiness
can be alleviated by depressing an appropriate lever. Plop, into our
food cup falls the elixir of life, compliments of the M and M Candy
Company.
How serious this affair has grown! The high priest of Behaviorism,
B. F. Skinner, in his recent book Beyond Freedom and Dignity,7 renews his plea for a turning away from the esoteria of values, attitudes,
anxieties and all such wishy-wash. We must concern ourselves solely,
he says, with changing the environment in such ways that we bring behavior under control. Now, this is a remarkable statement for anyone
to make, especially one who, unless I misread him, intends to change
our attitudes about thinking that attitudes are worthy of attention.
Perhaps, Professor Skinner understands, despite himself, that there is
something to be accomplished prior to launching a program that will
program society. Namely, he must bring others around to his point of
view and, with that, he is flirting with heresy; that is, if it is possible for
divinity to offend itself. And , by the way, I do not choose to be ensnared by that old Behaviorist catch-all, that the book itself, like all
books, is effective through some ill-defined series of reinforcements
transpiring between reader and printed page and, therefore, does not
qualify as attitude changing. The plain fact is that Skinner, like all
conditioners, realizes that there is something about behavior that is
prior to its outer manifestations, namely, a certain activation functioning, as Campbell puts it, "through appropriate influences from without,
but then a response in terms of one's readiness and pace of growth ... "
One of the best features of Behaviorism has been its exorcism of the
term "mind" from scientific vocabulary; that is, in the sense in which
it is usually taken as a substance or entity residing somewhere within.
Once a mind/matter dualism is posited, science is led to a sense of
dead ends, having as its final reward a reiteration of those very con126

cepts which have always stood in the way of intellectual progress. As
A. F. Bently put it:
Consider a definition by which consciousness is made to be a
unique relation which may maintain on occasion between a
living organism and its world. So far as the words go, they keep
the organism and the world separate, posit a relation, and place
this in a series of relations, making it "unique" with respect to
all others of the series. Each of those words has a huge background of possible shadings of meaning. And yet, no matter how
we crystallize each of them, the one most probable remark
about consciousness is tha t it is that aspect of experience in
which there is a comprehensiveness of organism and world and
rela tionship; that is, in which these words have broken down
entirely. And further it is only on the basis of these words that a
uniqueness can be asserted. [Italics mine].8
The point is, that as Behaviorism has succeeded in shifting attention away from a "mind" that h as "a huge background of possible
shades of meaning," it has managed to transfer in total all the ambiguities to an equally uncertain domain called "environment:" a domain
that Behaviorists would have us rationally order for the reason that
human beings are nothing but animals determind by and responding
to their "environment." All right, which one? And where is it? Behaviorism's most significant contribution to date would be to answer
these most perplexing questions.
As Arthur Koestler notes in his book, Th e Ghost in the Machine,
"environment" is as much determined by the state of the organism
as by the setting in which behavior is occurring. Of particular concern,
Koestler says, are those occasions where skilled (operantly conditioned)
behaviors break down because of a sudden shift in what is "environment" to the organism.
. . . a changing, variable environment demands flexible behavior, and reverses the trend towards mechanization ... the
challenge of the environment can exceed a critical limit where
it can no longer be met by skilled routine, however flexiblebecause the customary "rules of the game" are no longer adequate to cope with the situation. Then a crisis arises. The outcome is either a breakdown of behavior-"when in danger or in
doubt, run in circles, scream and shout," [or] the sudden
emergence of new forms of behavior, of original solutions ... 9
How many environments can we enumerate that become, at various times, a relevant matrix within which behavior occurs? I may find
my body embedded within a perfectly controlled environment which
Behaviorists will mold for me, but my environment of most critical
importance may be imagination: projecting a course of action for a
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setting and situation to be encountered not here and now, but tomorrow or ten years from now. And what of behavior that occurs, as it
were, in a "social environment" where, according to Behaviorists principles, the controlling features of environment are not now inert things,
but other people? In this instance, how am I to be trained to respond
to an "environment" that, supposedly, will have been trained to respond to me? Clearly, this leads to a series of absurd regressions where
controller and controlled dance first in one pair of shoes, then another.
A consequence of assigning technical competence the primary role in
determining adequacies in social rela tions is, as Elton Mayo points out,
a clear a nd present danger:
Our theory of civilization acts on the assumption that if technical and material advancement is maintained, human cooperation will somehow be inevitable . . . . Social life resembles biological in at least one aspect; when normal processes cease
pathological growth begins ... as a consequence we are technically competent as no other age in history has been; and we
combine this with utter social incompetence.10
Which leads to this: The contributions of Behaviorism should be
clearly defined within a definite context, one that clearly allows for
its own inherent limitations and excludes from its field of application
all phenomena which cannot reasonably be expected to remain invariant, day to day. This means that operant conditioning will contribute the most when it delineates its field of relevance: a field, it
will be seen, tha t is considerably more narrow than the aspirations of
its most enthusiastic devotees.
As hard as it may be to swallow, the greatest service we can perform as educators is to leave room for a vacuum in the lives of students: a vacuum that "nature abhors." Wha tever enters this space
will be of the individuals' liking, not necessarily ours. W e provide some
resources and whatever opportunities we can, but then we must respect
the principle of fermenta tion in accord with one's own orgasmicenvironmental tempo.
Can we now see yet another dimension to the wit of Mulla
Nasrudin? That the grammar of the day may not save us during
especially crucial moments. Can we also see that this reference to
grammar is an anagogical device representing the larger vicissitudes of
life; that is, the various "topics" and "phrases" that cluster around
life and shroud it with apparently, but only apparently, vital meanings.
As Ortega y Gasset explains:
A topic is an idea that is used, not because it is evident, but because people say it. A phrase is that which is not thought out
every time, but is simply said, repeated ... 11
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I think that by now my meaning is coming through: that our concern for reforms or innovations in education can become cantankerously ensnared in the grammar of the day-the various topics and phrases.
What we really need to learn is how to swim. And that, as I have
said, involves attention to an aspect of our existence that has a logic
of its own, not one imposed within the structu res of the classroom.
The non-swimmer is one who spends the greater part of his time bobbing upon the surface in the frailest of crafts. He understands only
the shallowest meaning of himself. As Gasset goes on to say:
His individual, effective and always more primitive "I" is replaced by the "I" which is "people," by the conventional, complica ted, cultivated "I." 12
Small wonder that so many of today's youth are, as one says,
"messed up." For in refusing to accept parental definitions of the good
life, they have nevertheless not discovered, no doubt for having never
been told, that the self with which they confront society's evils is the
same complicated "I" that society structures and maintains. As Zen
Buddhists say, one cannot wipe off blood with blood. The very real
frustrations expe rienced by these youth are, in part, traceable directly
to us for having failed in our responsibility to educate. That is, society's refusal to respond is the other aspect of our refusal to see through
the complicated "I": a refusal to deal with life in terms other than
those which the conventional understanding of ourselves dictates, and
an unwillingness to see as partly "in here" problems we naively insist
:1rt' tota ll y ··out there," a nd Yice versa.
In a similar way, our universities ( centers, it is said, for our best
thinking) test one reform then another, retreading, for God knows
how long, the outworn and wornout "topics" and "phrases" of progressive education. In their zeal to get on with it, few stop to consider that idleness, non-activity, isolation, and separation are essential
to inner development to no less extent than planning, movement, involvement, and integration are to the outer forms of civilization. Herein, we should note, lies a key to a revolution, not a reform, that can
set education to new directions. Intuitively, our students often seem
to understand principles of inactivity better than we, but they are
forced to work within assumptive frameworks of the operational
modes we h elp to maintain. Consequently, we see them, in frustration,
trying to fit operational modes to purposes that can be served only by
activity, separation, pre-occupation with oneself, and hermetic workingthrough. In exasperation they flirt with occultisms, witchcraft, organic
bod y-cults, nature worship, revolutionary utopianisms, and all manners of operational schemes intended to reach a portion of themselves
which is, paradoxically, beyond the reach of anything grammar can do
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to see through itself. What they want, and what we could help to provide, is a taste for a different kind of pi, which the punster might see
to mean a different constant used in surveying the outer dimensions
of matters that lie, as the ancients put it, with the center everywhere
and the circumference nowhere.
There is yet another sense in which all of this can be taken. I refer
now to some ideas put forth by Thomas Szasz in his controversial book
The Myth of Mental Illness,13 wherein he examines the nature of what
is commonly called illnesses of the mind. Szasz suggests the intriguing
possibility that illness stems from a failure on a person's part to find,
as he says, a game worth playing. Assuming that Szasz is on to something, I should like to direct attention to a very clumsy and self-defeating game we are still trying to play, even though we know enough to
know better. The rule of this game is to play as if the individual can
amount to something only to the degree that a vague and lifeless
entity called society approaches some sort of ideal condition. Even
more ruthlessly, we are told, and then we tell others, that nothing
could be more gratifying, and significant of a life well-lived, than to
devote oneself to the betterment of that bloodless abstraction. I will
not deny that working through and with others is a necessary and rewarding experience, after all I am a teacher; but to dedicate all or
even a major portion of oneself to goals having a strictly social context is to ignore extremely important activities that are completely
private. One of these is the dream life of the individual, that totally
inaccessible inner realm that can become socially manifested only by
producing communicable symbols; but then the symbol is not the thing
represented, only a facsimile. The dream itself remains absolutely
private.
To ask that a person become fully engaged in the collective dream,
that system of shared symbols called cultural values, goals, and expectations, is to ask that he deny his inner world: the vas hermeticum
in which, from time immemorial, has brewed the creative spirit and the
self-transcending hero who lifts himself to a higher plane of awareness
and integration. The more we insist that individual worth be established on the basis of social progress, i.e., changes that can be verified
through observation and measurement and which bring society closer
to approximation of an ideal condition, the more we find ourselves
pursuing an illusory utopia whose wholeness we believe will signal the
wholeness of the individual. This is sheer folly and must be classified
among the games not worth playing.
Unfortunately, we not only play it, we play it to the hilt. It is
precisely here that our projects for a humane and self-fulfilling education go wrong. However well-intentioned, admonishments to collectivize our lives and to find one's greater purposes and meanings in the
service of God, country, other people, or what not, can be invitations to
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spiritual anguish. A principal difference about today's young people is
their discovery of this inward impoverishment at an earlier age than
we. This is the real thrust, as I see it, behind the driving need to "do
one's own thing" or to "blow one's mind." We should and must
see in this a clear indication of disservice to a genuine human prosperity: the need to grow and evolve in cooperation with a part of our
nature that has a logic different from the categories of the intellect.
One consequence of the frustra tion is an attempt to regress: to
drop out, get back to nature, restore a condition of primitive innocence
or some such, and we see this occurring. Can we understand, however,
the irony that solutions of this sort are still overdetermined by and
ensnared within the prima rily operational mode of living? What regressors fail to see is that the problems are not so much the consequences of the operational mode as the operational mode itself. Attempting to regress, therefore, is to repeat the same mistake in a different direction. Any thought that the good life follows on the heels of
obliterating science, business, and technology ( those arch-enemies of
human nature) errs by assuming that outward manipulations can lead
to inner peace and harmony. I cannot see how this assumption differs
from the world views of those "others" known as the establishment.
Self-transcendence and striving for inner balance and wholeness
are not realized by regaining lost innocence, going back to nature, or
even a coming home in some Biblical sense. The innocence, if we can
call it that, of self-actualizing man resides in a balancing of intellect
and operationalisms on the one hand, with profound perceptions and
intuitive understandings on the other; and this means going forward,
not backward. Is it not a fundamental fact of evolution generally, that
the interplay between organism and environment is complete? As the
organism evolves so does environment. An organism attempting to
regress to an earlier evolutionary stage in the face of environmental
problems creates his own aliena tion, which is to say, he no longer fits
the present environment. In turn, alienation itself now becomes a
problem with a consequent effort, perha ps, to regress even more .
Cybrneticists call this a positive feedback loop: actions intended to
solve a problem worsen it only to call forth additional faulty actions.
This is thoroughly neurotic behavior.
This is not to say, however, that regression cannot be employed in
a creative way; that is, as long as it becomes not an end in itself, but
a pmlude to an innovative advance. Arthur Koestler calls this a
strategy of "reculer pour mieux sauter"-of drawing back to leap.
The essence of the process which I have described [says Koestler] is an evolutionary retreat from specialized adult forms of
bodily structure and behaviour, to an earlier or more primitive,
but also more plastic and less committed stage-followed by a
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sudden advance in a new direction. It is as if the stream of life
had momentarily reversed its course, flowing uphill for awhile,
then opened up in a new stream bed . . . this is a favorable
gambit in the grand strategy of the evolutionary process; and it
also plays an important role in the progress of science and
art.14

Now let us come back full circle to the concept of "hermetic pedagogy." It will be recalled that the Greek god Hermes was a guide or
conductor of souls to the underworld. ( Incidentally, I find it interesting
that winged-footed Mercury is still among us as the logo for Florists
Transworld Delivery, a super-network of businesses that rely heavily
upon the death industry.) The vas hermeticum is to be associated then
with a form of dying; a process of nigredo as alchemists called it,
where base elements are destroyed, giving rise to a new fo1m: the
filus philosophorum, through which one attains the Philosophers' stone.
In our present terminology, it is a drawing back to leap, to achieve a
transformation, not to resume the character of baser elements. A
psychological term for this is metanoia. Once again, the temporary regression requires a sealing-off from outward time and an inward-turning to inward time, followed by a leaping forward in terms of one's
readiness and pace of growth.
Many young people today seem to understand only half of this
progess, the nigredo, which they take to be the final goal. As justification they point to the Oriental hermit who forsakes the world for the
"forest years" whereby he will attain M oksha, or final release in a total
oblivion of ego. What they fail to understand is that the most beloved
character of the East is not the hermit, but the Boddhisattva, one who
returns to the world to live, love and teach among all others.
Accordingly, my recommendations are not to be taken as meaning
there is nothing the educator can or should do. It is our function to
provide those influences from without, but then to know when enough
is enough. The greater danger is not that we might do too little, but
that we do too much. In fact, I sometimes wonder if concern over including affective experiences in education is a veiled form of saying we
are looking for ways to motivate students? To keep them active at a
level concomitant with all we wish to teach them. This is where we
must check our enthusiasms. We carry out our function, as we should,
of providing resources and whatever insights we can manage; but
then we come off it with our moralizing, petty reinforcements, allusions to various abstract ideals, and then grading, of all things, in accordance with success in, as we say, coming to "grips" with the subject
matter. As if things weren't bad enough, now we want to integrate cognition and emotion!-right there in the halls of an institution that has
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already replaced most of man's inner life with the unattainable values
of a collective ideal.
We can begin moving in new directions by performing an action
that is long overdue : abolish grading. As Bertrand Russell once said
of Christianity, can anything that requires for its preservation an endless series of apologetics and reforms really be worth saving. Assessment
of competency in some areas requiring a high degree of skill is no doubt
necessary. Frankly, I would prefer that any brain surgeon of mine be a
straight "A" student. But there is no reason whatsoever for testing and
grading in that area loosely called general education. With what audacity can we judge individual processes of growth, expanding awareness,
and self-actualizing? For my part, in a senior seminar I teach, I have
begun a policy of issuing everybody an "A" on the first day of class:
a policy that will continue until grading is discontinued or I am relieved of my job. However, one often hears arguments concerning difficulties posed for transfer students when grading is not used. This
existentially tragic situation I consign to the genius of those in administration who love nothing so well as a good problem over which
they can wring their hands. Suffice it to say, in the matter of grading,
here is one small step that can be taken in the way of leaving people
alone.
Next, let us pay our due respects to the operant conditioners who
probably know more about skill acquisition than anyone else. But let
us not pretend that creativity, imagination, intuitive richness, instinctual delights, and the other oh-so-human characteristics of humans are
nothing more than inculcated reactions to so-called environment. And
let us not take their ability to get results to mean getting results that
are always in our best interest.
Lest I appear prejudiced, let me further suggest a partial dismantling of all disciplines which have served more to disintegrate than
integrate students and faculty alike. Whenever possible, students should
be afforded an opportunity for exploring important questions, mostly
their questions, aided by a multiplicity of perspectives which faculty
from their individual specializations can offer. In practical terms this
can mean a form of team teaching. Those who have not experienced it
will be surprised at the ways in which topics receive illumination from
hitherto unsuspected directions. One can cultivate a taste for playing
with metaphors this way, and he can find that they open new perspectives on matters he had thought were foregone conclusions.IS
One suggestion I do not intend to be taken lightly is that we begin
to counsel some students away from college. We all know that higher
education has become, for most, something that one does simply because he has graduated from high school. This is a waste of everyone's
time and a very real threat to the well-being of the student. As mentioned previously, it is at this age when, more than anything, a person
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might need a degree of privacy and "outward turning of ears, eyes, and
heart to the mysteries of life and the universe." During this time he
may even discover a number of important questions which may later
bring him to our doorsteps in search of answers. In this sense it really
doesn't matter whether the freshman is teenaged, in his 30's, or even
in his 70's.
Finally, in the matter of educating the emotions, I hope we can see
that it is more a question of standing aside than of contrived intervention. Few could have a more vital interest in this affair than psychotherapists; yet, research indicates again and again that effective therapy depends more upon the personality of the practitioner and the
empathic relationship than upon the particular theoretical persuasion
of the therapist. What wonders can transpire if we just cease deviling
people with one or another criterion of performance. Can we not
understand as the ancient alchemists did, that recipes of transmutation
represent Man's intervention in the processes of nature; that "in taking
upon himself the responsibility of changing Nature, Man [puts] . . .
himself in the place of time ... "16
One might notice at this point a contradiction in my analogy.
Namely, that the alchemist did intervene in time, whereas I am asking
that we devalue intervention. The difference is this: ,vhereas the alchemist, like the O1iental mystic, operates within the structure of fixed
procedures and a clearly defined common goal, people of the West
have no collective theology, cosmology, mythology, or even sociopolitical sentiment to guide individuals toward any "ultimate realization." Accordingly, we can not assure the existence of generally appropriate times for intervention , ( i.e., a psychologically "ripr" period ,)
much less an end product that will shine with the same luminosity as
the ubiquitous alchemists' gold.
While avoiding the kinds of harmful intercessions I have been discussing, there are, nevertheless some "influences from without" that
can act as catalysts for inner fermentation. For one thing, we should
encourage the use of all of a person's senses in exploring himself and
the world. Our education is much too oriented toward what can be
either seen or heard. It should be noted that these are sensory modalities which involve distal stimulations: information concerning objects
and events kept at a certain distance. We would do well thinking of
ways to include the other senses such as touch, smell, taste, pressure,
proprioception, temperature, and so on. Whereas the former tend to
maintain the world in abstract, i.e., through use of symbols, the latter
bring experience close to the "raw," where knowing is less a matter
of formulation and analysis than it is a feeling in one's gut. "Topics"
and "phrases" are of no use in these experiences and the individual
must look to other means of knowing, perhaps in the Biblical sense of
a person "knowing" his lover. Here again the team teaching approach
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can help, for this is the realm of the arts. Where the scientist leaves off,
the sculptor takes over. Or is it the other way around? Those who team
teach know the importance of this question.
Additionally, we can rebel against the way in which our bodies
have been politicized. And a feudal structure at that! We have subjected certain regions of the body to the servitude of others until we
are chopped up, much as Marshall McLuhan's Mechanical Bride.17 In
the same way that we invest the eyes and ears with a larger portion of
"reality," we exile sensuality and eroticism to the remote zones of the
sexual organs. As an old professor of mine once said, "why so? it's all
the same nervous system!" Add to this psychosomatic fragmentation
Freud's principle of proj ection and what we have is the person who
can find no way to self-fulfillment except through promoting the utopian democracy : an overthrowing of tha t feudalistic and tyrannical system "out there." What he wants is unity and assimilation all right, but
in himself, a t tha t center of experiences where he senses everything
is wrong. All efforts to obtain total organismic involvement through
an exaggerated exercise of isolated erotic zones, however, leads to a
painful repetition compulsion. Is it possible, we might ask, that the person like ourselves, who eats while he reads, while he watches TV, while
he smokes, while he talks with a friend is engaging in perverted body
eroticism? Tha t he tries to produce in an additive way a unified experience? Like any good bureaucrat, he thinks that an optimal functioning of each unit will provide the ultimate institution.
Here is where we can help our students: by ceasing to pretend that
our sex education classes and various hygiene courses are really what
they need and want. What they want is to learn how to live, which as
I have indicated earlier may be a matter of unlearning much of wh at
they have been taught: to shake loose of the operational mode.
Possibly most important of all, we should respect free-wheeling
imagination, fantasy, speculation, exploration, and any and all a ttempts
to bring oneself in accord with what has been called the Mysterium
Tremendum : a sense of awe over the miracle that every thing which
is, is at all. Compared with that mystery all the manifesting virgins and
bleeding palms in the world are reduced to freak shows on a midway.
We can encourage this endless search through the miracle of life by
letting people know we respect their dreams. Again, a large part of this
can be accomplished by ceasing to impose our own standards ( are they
our own?) upon them. How often, for example, have we said "that's
a n irresponsible statement!"; "that's not a fact, it's fancy!"; "can you
demonstrate a proof of that!" ; or some similar insult intended-and I
hope you catch the meaning- to shape them up.
It is true tha t all this may be taken as a recommendation regarding
what is "good" for people, i.e., a set of ideals imposed from without.
The difference, however, is my insistence that what is largely in a per-
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son's best interest is an opportunity--afforded him to view his own
needs, wants, wishes, dreams, loves, fears, and conflicts as legitimate:
perfectly natural organism-environment transactions that are focused
at that experiential position he calls "I." An unrelenting input of expectations and ideals totally from without can desensitize that "I,"
leading to a burden of frustration and guilt one can never escape because there is no way he can abandon himself. To repeat (because it
is so important), even our most altruistic efforts to provide for the
welfare of another can become additional strains upon an already
over-stressed individual who has learned to regret his personal deficiencies in regard to a collective idea. This is "Mr. Americanism," where
the notion of self-perfection is defined as approximation to an image,
but the emerging heroes of today are not muscle-bound as much as
bounded in abstractions. Their god-like qualities shine not in oiledmuscle, but in "perfected character." They are gurus, preacher-poets,
self-styled avatars, ego-tripping-egoless-Buddhas, revolutionary quacks
and soci ety-repressed professors who could lead us upward and onward
save for the restraints of the unenlightened masses.
The creative mind [says Koestler] perceives things in a new
light, the snob in a borrowed light; his pursuits are sterile,
and his satisfactions of a vicarious nature. He does not aim at
power; he merely wants to rub shoulders with those who wield
power, and bask in their reflected glory. What he admires in
public would bore him when alone, but he is unawa re of it.
When he reads Kirkegaard, he is not moved by wh a t he reads,
he is moved by himself reading Kirkegaard but he is blissfully
unaware of it. His emotions do not derive from the object, but
from extraneous sources associated with it; his satisfactions are
pseudo-satisfactions, his triumphs are self-delusions ... 18
This is why I have suggested that we begin our proposals for a
general education with "The most a general education can accomplish
is . . . . " We can never completely avoid an imposition of ideals for
the reason that things are affirmed even through their negation, but in
relative terms it is possible to develop goals that are "better" in regard
to respecting individual differences. This means a devaluation of
criteria for performance, formulated as ideals, stemming from committee members who probably know even less about students than about
each other.
What, we ask, can this mean for a general education? To answer
this we must first ask what is general about human existence that requires understanding, working through, and internationalization. Said
another way, is it possible that the fully human experience is nourished
upon perennial understandings in much the same way that the body
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maintains wholeness to the degree that essential nutritional substances
are available in minimum supply? This would mean searching for
unmistakable commonalities in experience that form, as it were, the
vitamins of existential health. This sort of approach at least turns proposal writing efforts away from the various "topics" and "phrases" of
the day, as seen in a current sado-masochistic tendency to view general education as an integration of different disciplines, and toward
matters concerning recurring issues about which disciplinary knowledge
may or may not provide relevant insights. What a relief this would be!
As examples, two clearly recognizable perennial aspects of experience are birth and death. We do a miserable service to understanding
birth in our sex education courses and when it comes to death we have
nothing to say. It is ignored. It is something a person simply awaits,
no doubt in a geriatrics unit conveniently out of sight and mind. At
that critical moment when life is about to slip away we leave the dying
with little more than sentiments of a clergyman who knows a lot about
death, but nothing about dying. How much more problematic (and
tragic! ) our ignorance becomes when we fail to cast birth-death into a
psycho-mythological framework. That is, understanding a principle
of appearance-disappearance-renewal that may well be a "constant" in
nature's processes: a principle understood by "primitives," but considered unscientific for that reason.
Another constant in experience appears to be a need to participate
in the sense of a suspension of one's usual orientation to identity as a
concrete, isolated island of certainty in the midst of an uncertain universe. In the words of Levy-Bruh!:
The need of participation remains something more imperious
and intense, even among people like ourselves [italics mine],
than the thirst for knowledge and the desire for conformity with
the claims of reason. It lies deeper in us and its source is more
remote.19
It is evident that this principle is widely misunderstood. Taken in
its popular form, it means that discussion groups, per se, are desirable
because they encourage "participation." Yet, the way in which one
participates is carefully scrutinized, in the case of "sensitivity" groups,
by other participants who will see to it that an individual learns to
open up in accordance with a collective standard. The problem is indeed in communication, but rather in the sense of self-forgetting, not
in the popular sense of mouthing right-sounding "topics" and
"phrases" which are sure signs of the self-conscious person.
It is important to understand that participation, in the large sense
in which I use it, cannot be taught. All that one can do is point in
various directions, designate opportunities, and legitimize the effort.
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Some of the more useful pointers or aids will come from the art forms
for self-transcendent experiences. If educators are truly serious about
learning experiences which include both cognitive and affective aspects,
then collaboration with the artist is indispensable. Of course, this will
require humility on the part of scientist-types: an admission that their
grammar has limited application and that many of the different
aspects of working with emotion that they encounter have been solved
in the arts a long time ago. A closely related enterprise would be the
legitimizing of manual labor. The idea being that a life lived too much
in the abstract-as many professors realize-is an unearthly existence.
There is no reason whatsoever for requiring students to become intellectual hermits for four years. Without active work with the hands or
some other form of "relief" from textbooks and lectures, life becomes
schizoid and unbearably drab. Various outward bound programs are
probably a step in a better direction, but most instructors view them
with suspicion, as a waste of time, or as neglecting serious study for
irresponsible gallivanting about.
The most interesting ( and controversial) recommendation of all
concerns the use of esoteric means toward participation. I think there
is much to be learned about the benefits of meditation, ritual, sensory
expansion, and drugs in pointing toward new understandings. In so far
as none of these are viewed as ends in themselves they can provide a
certain shock effect indicating that alternative modes of awareness
are possible. Our usual inability to see somtething other than the
familiar is the largest barrier to exploring other types of understandings that may require radical (i.e., fundamental) changes in perception. Otherwise, every attempt to discover difference turns out to be
sameness with a new hat. Moreover, and I wish to emphasize this,
unless we get into this business people will continue to do it on their
own. We must take Levy-Bruhl seriously concerning the deep-rootedness of a need to participate. Unless we legitimize self-transcendence,
participation, mind expansion or whatever other name it goes by, and
provide opportunities for sensible experimentation into alternative
modes of perception and feeling, people will undertake their own
"trips": unsupervised, amateurish, and laden with all the hideous
dangers we are now seeing in the rapid spread of addiction. All of the
fancy drug education programs in the world, no matter how well
financed and staffed, will not meet a need that lies in a totally different
qualitative dimension.
Additionally, what provisions have been made in higher education for legitimizing and facilitating curiosity and a sense of awe and
wonder? For the most part, these are treated as forms of "motivation"
which students are expected to display in response to a predetermined
academic format. One should be awestruck, we say, by the beauties of
theoretical models, intersecting functions, prepared by others. Appar138

ently, we have not understood that wonder and cunos1ty are fickle
companions for another person's insights ; that these are the ingredients of one's own acts of discove1y and creativity which can and do
atrophy if not exercised. Again, the most educators can do to encourage awe, wonder, and a playing out of curiosity is to provide occasions and opportunities. Accordingly, one of the most appropriate
resources for accomplishing this is found in speculation.
By definition, specula tion is concerned with possibilities which m ay
have not one, but m any modes of actualiza tion. It is away from the
sphere of ready-made answers tha t people find some elbow room;
where education and educators have not foreclosed upon where imagination can lead . The student's imagination. In short, we create some
opportunities for people to engage in legitimized (because recognized
and encouraged ), zany thinking a nd feeling. We should just look at
the unlimited number of universes of discourse available for far-out
speculation! The sciences and science fiction, parapsychology, eugenics,
bioelectronic feedback, m etaphysics of several varieties, synthesized
music, urban planning ( ! ) , international politics, and on and on. All
containing a luna tic fringe of speculation which, by now, we should
have learned to regard more politely and with considerably less scepticism. H erein lies general education, where today's over-generalizations
are often tomorrow's understatements.
Throughout, I have attem pted to promote the feeling of a certain
direction in which we can move in education. To the few proposals I
have mentioned I am certain m any more creative ideas can be added.
The important underlying theme is tha t we begin with the requirements of the individual, not the imposed ideals and standards of any
collectivity. W e must bring to bea r all of our scholarship and talents to
discover what is general about human experience a nd then adjust our
pedagogy to those universal rhythms, in the same way that we will save
our envi ronment only when we respect its systemic logic and then adjust technology to the warp and woof of its na tural processes. Anything
else is grammar. It is the forebrain, drunk with power and disrupting
other organismic centers in an attempt to impose its own demands on
theirs. Success at one level is defeat at another.
To end one's remarks with a quote is to say, all at once, what had
been attempted during the previous myriads of words. Which means
either that more was said than necessary, in which case the quote
would h ave sufficed, or tha t not enough was said, which the quote is
now intended to remedy. Nevertheless:
A ship seemed about to sink, and the passengers were on their
knees praying and repenting, promising to make all kinds of
amends if only they could be saved. Only Mulla Nasrudin was
unmoved. Suddenly in the midst of the panic he leaped up and
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shouted, "steady, now, friends! Don't change your ways- don't
be too prodigal. I think I see land."
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At the outset of this monograph it is noted that, despite the growing interest in interdisciplinary approaches to higher education, there
has been only limited discussion of the philosophy and methodology of
team teaching at this level in educational literature. With this in mind,
the authors, Horatio M. LaFauci and Peyton E. Richter, have set out
to describe "the nature and scope of selected [coll ege level] team teaching programs, the manner in which such programs can be administered,
the potential impact of team teaching on a developing curriculum, the
role of faculty and students who constitute the teaching-learning teams,
the particular housing requirements of team teaching programs, and
finally the limitations and future prospects of this emerging concept"
(p. ix).
In measming the success of the authors' endeavor the term "selected" in the above statement of purpose is crucial. The monograph
is an excellent in-depth study of one college level team teaching program. The reader will find some intriguing suggestions for interdisciplinary projects in chapter three, and teaching facilities to dream
about in chapter five. What is more important, by reading the entire
book, the reader will get some feeling for the depth of commitment
needed to make team teaching at the college level effective. For this
reason alone the work should be required reading for anyone contemplating participation in, or the development of, a team-taught program at the college level. However, the book does not contain the
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comprehensive discussion of the philosophy and methodology of team
teaching in higher education that the title and opening paragraphs
might suggest. LaFauci is presently Dean, and Richter, Professor of
Humanities, at Boston University's College of Basic Studies, "where
a team system was first developed in 1949 and where an entire collegiate two-year program of studies now functions on a team teaching
plan," (p. ix) . Therein lies the strength as well as some of the weaknesses of their work. The authors certainly cannot be accused of empty
theorizing; the conclusions arrived at by Lafauci and Richter are
drawn from a sizeable reservoir of experience with the Boston University program. However, this very reliance upon the experience
gained from a program tailored to the needs of a particular university
has, in the final analysis, resulted in a rather parochial view of teamteaching at the college level.
The opening chapter of the work is broad enough in scope, containing a brief survey of a number of diverse team-teaching programs
presently in operation in colleges and universities throughout the country. At the conclusion of the chapter the reader involved in program
development and interested in the possibilities of team-teaching at the
college level will probably be led to speculate as to the relative
strengths and weaknesses of these various approaches. Unfortunately
that question remains unanswered throughout the book. The reader is
presented with evidence of diversity in team teaching approaches, but,
for the most part, he is left to make of it what he will.
In chapter two, Lafauci and Richter take what might have served
as a first step toward an analysis of team-teaching diversity by introducing a theoretical scheme representing "three fixed reference points
on a continuum of possible team patterns" (p. 21). These three theoretical team patterns are differentiated from one another by a consideration of the degree to which faculty participation and program
content are controlled by administrative agencies outside the team
itself. While this emphasis on the administrative characteristics of the
teaching team is certainly not out of place in a chapter entitled "Administering a Team Teaching Program," it is indicative of a point of
view that pervades the book as a whole and, one suspects, reflects the
biases of the authors. Throughout the work there is a constant awareness of, and, some might argue, a preoccupation with, administrative
and logistical details. Some will find this helpful, others will find it disconcerting. For one primarily interested in innovative teaching techniques, the usefulness of the above schema is questionable. It says
very little about the role and commitment of faculty and students in
a given type of team pattern. If integration of subject matter is the
central concern of team teaching, then it would seem to be more meaningful to differentiate teams according to the ways in which, and the
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extent to which, integration is realized.I Elsewhere in the book (p. 73) ,
the a uthors briefly mention a classification scheme that comes closer
to serving the purpose of differentiating team pa tterns according to
the level of integration present. Unfortunately these distinctions do not
appear to have been as fruitful for the authors as the administrative
distinctions m ade in the second chapter. They are not referred to
agam.
The real shortcoming of chapter two and the work as a whole,
however, is not the na ture of the authors' schema so much as it is their
failure to m ake use of the schema they have developed. H aving gone
to the trouble of distinguishing three different team patterns, the
authors conclude tha t, "since the coordinated-innova tive team is currently the most highly developed and most common mode of organization, it is primaril y from this vantage point tha t the administrative
fun ctioning of the teaching team will be viewed throughout the remainder of this chapter," (p. 24). Not only is the remainder of chapter
two devoted to a discussion of the coordina ted-innova tive team, which,
not surprisingly, corresponds to the type of program in opera tion at
Boston University, but the rem ainder of the book as well. In view of
the significan t reduction in scope of the work from chapter two onward, a more app ropria te title for the work might have been, "A
Model For T eam T eaching a t the College Level."
Since the bulk of the work is devoted to an analysis of Boston University's College of Basic Studies program, it may be useful to potential readers to briefly delineate the m ajor cha racteristics of that program. The college has a single two- year integrated core curriculum
for all students. To teach this integrated core curriculum, a number
of teams have been established, each consisting of one faculty m ember from each of the college's fi ve dep artments: humanities, social
science, science, psychol ogy and guidance, and rhetoric. Individual
team innovation, while encouraged , is limited by college-wide curricular dema nds. The teams a re a ppointed by the college's administra tion after faculty consulta tion, and each team works with the same
students for a n entire academic year. The offices for each team are
clustered about a team office, whil e instructional facilities as well as
team offices are housed in a building redesigned to accommoda te team
teaching. In short, the Boston Uni versity program is a big-time operation designed to handle freshmen a nd sophomores a t a large institution. Wha t L aF auci a nd Richter are discussing is not so much team

I . Seve ra l questions can be ra ised in this regard concern ing a given team
configura tion. To wh a t extent is integra tion of subj ect m a tter left up to
the studen ts? H ow, a nd to wh a t extent, do fac ulty m embers wi thin th e
team a ttempt to integra te subject matter ? Does the structure of th e program
itse lf encourage or dema nd integration ?
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teaching at the college level as team teaching at the college-wide level.
The athors' heavy reliance upon their experiences in this program
forces the reader to question constantly the extent to which their conclusions can be validly generalized. For example, in chapter four,
where the reader is offered examples of specific student reactions
to the Boston University team teaching program, he must ask if the
general conclusions drawn by the authors concerning student acceptance of team teaching are warranted. Close scrutiny of those student
evaluations suggests that, at least to some extent, the success of the
Boston University program is due to particular conditions present
within that university's College of Basic Studies and not easily reproduced elsewhere, viz., the existence of a physical environment designed
to facilitate team teaching, and a two-year basic studies program that
serves as the focal point of a student's academic career during his
freshman and sophomore years and allows him frequent and sustained contacts with the same faculty members. Reading these evaluations is certainly an enlightening experience, but they are not readily
generalizable to team teaching in all or even in most forms. The same
can be said about the authors' reflections concerning the role of the
team in curriculum development (chapter three) and the limitations
of the team approach ( chapter six). What we have is an excellent detailed study of one particular team teaching program from which some
general conclusions can be drawn if the reader is careful to identify
those elements of the program discussed by Lafauci and Richter that
are not likely to be repeated at other institutions.
In spite of the above criticisms, T eam Teaching at the College
Level is a book that deserves to be read carefully by anyone now engaged in team teaching at the college level, or anyone contemplating
the formation of an academic program involving team teaching in the
future. As the authors point out on several occasions, a successful teamtaught program requires a great amount of pre-planning. Lafauci and
Richter have presented much to think about during those planning
sessions. For the faculty member contemplating the development of a
team-taught program or becoming involved in an already existing program, chapters four and six in particular should offer some insight
into what is probably the most crucial aspect of team teaching: the
depth and scope of required faculty commitment to the philosophy
of team teaching. Team teaching requires tha t each participating
faculty member find a balance between independence and cooperation
that allows for both personal growth and team growth. That is something that cannot be successfully legisla ted or imposed upon the team
by outside forces regardless of the team pattern.
Many in-depth studies such as this present one will be required
before we have anything approaching a comprehensive understanding
of the philosophy and methodology of team teaching in higher educa-
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tion. The work of LaFauci and Richter must be seen as a vital first
step in this direction, not as the definitive work on this subj ect. Viewed
from this perspective, it is a valuable addition to our understanding of
teaching methodology.
David Hargreave
Western M ichigan University
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